■D32 



ANALYSIS 



OF 



Noah K. Davis's Elements of 
Deductive Logie 



A.ND OF HIS 



Elements of Psychology 



By 

COLLINS DENNY 

One of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church, South 



Nashville, Tenn. 

Dallas, Tex. ; Richmond, Va. 

Publishing House of the M. E. Church, South 

Smith & Lamar, Agents 

1916 



D** 



^^^3> 



Copyright, 1916 

BY 

Smith & Lamar 



1^^ 



r 



FEB -2 1917 

>CI.A453885 



PEEFACE. 

These Analyses have been prepared at the request of the 
College of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 
chiefly for the benefit of our undergraduate preachers. It is 
hoped that they may also be of aid to other students who use 
the books here analyzed. 

Some of this work was prepared for the benefit of my stu- 
dents during the years of my professorship in Vanderbilt 
University and proved helpful to those who were really try- 
ing to master the courses. As a student of that great and 
much-loved teacher, John B. Minor, I first learned to analyze 
with some satisfaction the books to which I gave all my 
strength. The best work I have ever done has been done on 
this plan, the work that stays with me most fully, the work 
that lies out before me as a landscape viewed from an eleva- 
tion. It is not unlikely that others may find this method 
profitable. 

In the study of Logic and of Psychology there are some 
difficulties, but these are not greater than the student meets 
in many other branches, perhaps not so great as he meets in 
Latin, Greek, or Mathematics. The man who cannot con- 
quer a difficulty such as is here met is unfitted for an intel- 
lectual life. Intellectual training and mental independence 
are won in the mastery of such difficulties. Certainly since 
the days of Aristotle, more than two millenniums ago, stu- 
dents have been mastering these very difficulties. 

These Analyses will bring to the attention of the student a 
few points not to be found in the text of the Logic. These 
points are noted because my experience as a teacher showed 
that they were helpful, sometimes necessary. Some correc- 
tions of the text will be found, chiefly in the treatment of 
conditionals. No man could have been more ready than Mr. 
Davis to acknowledge a mistake nor more quick to correct 

(3) 



4 Preface. 

it. Most of these corrections were discussed with him and 
accepted ; a few are due to his suggestions. 

The Logic gives in numerous cases examples of the proper 
application of the principles. As a further aid to the student 
a few of the praxes are solved, some of the more difficult 
being selected. 

The plan of the Analyses is that devised by John B. Minor 
and used in his "Institutes.'^ He explains it as follows : 

"The arrangement is designed to exhibit to the eye on the 
page, not only the carefully digested order of the propositions, 
but their relative subdivision also, indicated by their stand- 
ing more or less to the right. The most prominent proposi- 
tions are designated by the Eoman numerals I., II., III., etc., 
on the extreme left of the page; and then, as a guide to the 
reader, the intended position of the subordinate headings 
(designated by the Arabic numerals 1, 2, 3, etc.) is shown by 
small letters attached to the figures (1% 1^, 1°, etc.). Thus 
the subordinate heading first in importance and comprehen- 
siveness is indicated by 1% and the subsequent topics corre- 
sponding to that (being placed as nearly under it as possible) 
are designated as 2% 3% etc. So the next in subordination 
is represented as 1^, placed a little further to the right, and 
the subsequent corresponding heads (as nearly under 1^ as 
possible) by 2^ 3^ etc.'' ("1 Minor's Institutes," Preface, 
pages 6, 7.) 

In the following Analyses the figures on the right-hand 
margin refer to the sections and pages of the Logic and Psy- 
chology. Collins Denny. 

Richmond, Va., August 24, 1916. 



ANALYSIS OF NOAH K. DAVIS'S ELEMENTS OF 
DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

I. Introduction. 

1*. Definition of Logic §1, p. 1 

1^ Explication of the terms of the definition §2, p. 1 

V. Science defined. 
1"^. Science and art distinguished. 
1®. Logic not an art. 

2^ Thought defined and discriminated §3, p. 3 

1"^. The thought of which Logic treats. 

3^ Form as distinguished from matter §4, p. 4 

1*^. How mediaeval Logic distinguished matter and form. 
1^. First intentions what ? 
2®. Second intentions what? 
2*^. Matter and form do not exist separately. 
1®. How contemplate these apart, only by abstraction. 
1^ Logic an abstract science. 
2^ How Logic is fundamental to all other sciences. 

4°. Necessary forms §5, p. 5 

1*^. In what sense these forms are necessary. 
1®. Not as inventions to control thought, 
2®. Not as being inviolable, 

3®. But as conforming to the movement of mind when 
thought is legitimate and consequential, logically 
necessary. 
1^ Some kinds of necessity: 
1^. Philosophical, absolute, no conceivable alternative 

— e. g., axioms. 
2^. Physical, causative, no real but a conceivable al- 
ternative — e. g., the fall of an unsupported 
stone. 
3^. Practical, means to an end — e. g., to build must 

have material. 
4^. Moral, bound to do duty, obliged — e. g., moral 

law. 
5^. Logical, in order to truth. 

2^. Why a free treatment is adopted §6, p. 6 

2*. The Primary Laws of Logic. 

l^ Their origin and general character §7, p.. 8 

1*^. They may be discovered, either 

(5) 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

1^. By analyzing our thoughts, discharging all matter, 

and noting the characteristics of the forms, or 
2^^. By analyzing the empty forms, discovering the gen- 
eral abstract principles, and noting the character- 
istics. 
2''. Their place in Logic. 
3^. The formulation of the Laws. 
I*'. The notion of contradiction expressed in each law uni- 
fies them. 

2^ The Law of Identity §8, p. 9 

1*^. It is the principle of affirmation. 
2*^. How stated and illustrated. 
1®. The law extends to partial identity. 
2^. Rhetorical forms distinguished. 

3«. The Law of Contradiction §9, p. 9 

l'^. It is the principle of negation. 
2^. How stated and illustrated. 
1®. According to this law, contradictories must be de- 
nied of each other. 
1^ Absolute contradiction, as between A and non-A. 
2^ Specific contradiction, as between the species of a 
limiting genus. 
2®. Rhetorical forms distinguished — rhetorical paradox, 

4^ The Law of Excluded Middle §10, p. 11 

1*^. It prescribes a necessity in affirmation. 
2^. How stated and illustrated? 
1®. According to this law, of two absolute or specific 

contradictories, one must be true of any subject". 
2®. Reductio ad ahsurdum an application of this law. 
5*^. The compound statement in which the second and 

third laws are united §11, p. 11 

1^. Why the three laws cannot be summed in self-con- 
sistency. 
2*^. What is their common principle? 
3^. Why from no one law can the other two be deduced ? 
3^. Why Logic is only a negative criterion of realitv. 

§12, p. 12 

1*^. All that Logic is concerned with is to make sure that 

self -contradictory notions are not combined in a 

judgment. 

2^. Any violation of these laws is false in thought and in 

reality. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 7 

3^ The laws are related to existence, not positively, but 
negatively. 

4^ The Postulate of Logic §13, p. 13 

5^. The solution of an example §14, p. 14 

The first part of the first example illustrates the Law 
of Contradiction-Ehetorical Paradox — a woman wrote 
under the nam de plume of a man. The second part 
of the first example illustrates the Law of Contra- 
diction-Logical Paradox — because pronouns self-con- 
tradictory as to sex are combined in a judgment. 
II. Conception. 
l^ The notion. 

l''. The definition §15, p. 15 

2^. Concepts are here considered with reference to the 
things, the external objects which they represent and 
in which directly or indirectly they originate; they 
are considered as arising from them as their source, 
as constituted of the marks or qualities of the things, 
as applicable to one thing or common to many. This 
is their origin. 
1^. The three movements of thought in forming notions. 
1*^. Abstraction. 
1®. What it is, and how we abstract. 
2®. Marks, and their several kinds. 
3®. Marks as abstract and concrete. 

2^. Generalization §16, p. 17 

1®. What excites attention. 

2®. What generalization is and in what it issues. 

3^ Why generalization and classification are the same 

mental operation. 
4®. The relation of specialization to classification and to 
generalization. 

3^ Conception. §17, p. 18 

1®. What it is, and its product. 

2®. Why we must be content with partial and inadequate 

representation. 
3®. Individual and general concepts. 
4**. The coexistence of these mental movements. 

§18, p. 20 
1®. A mark and a concept commutable. 
3^ Denomination, its necessity and purpose. . . .§19, p. 20 
. 1^. Common names. 

1^. The difference between a mark and a concept. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

2^. How commorL nouns designate an individual object 
or group. 
2^. Proper names. 
4^. Concepts viewed with reference to their contents, they 
are considered as comprehending marks or extending 
to things. This is the quantity of concepts. 

§20, p. 22 
I*'. The intension of concepts. 
1**. By what determined. 
2^. What definition is. 
2^=. The extension of concepts. 
1^. By what determined. 
2*^. What division is. (Xote that connotation refers to 

intension, denotation to extension.) 
3^. The correlation of intension and extension. 
4^. How predicates are thought. 
h^. Concepts viewed with reference to the mind, or think- 
ing subject, they are considered as having gradations 
toward perfection. This is the quality of concepts. 

§21, p. 23 
1°. In what progress in knowledge chiefly consists. 
1^. Passing from obscure to clear thinking. 
1®. How this is accomplished. 
1*. By negative judgments setting apart a whole from 
other wholes, especially where they lie near to 
each other ; or by remarking a specific difference 
— e. g., blessed is the man that walketh not in 
the counsel of the ungodly, etc. 
2^. Passing from confused to distinct thinking. 
1®. How this is accomplished. 
1*. By affirmative judgments, viewing a concept as a 
plurality, distinguishing the marks or the objects 
that constitute it. Or the notion is applied to 
its various objects, and it then becomes known 
by what is contained under it — e. g., charity 
beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all 
things, endureth all things. 
2^ What precedes and what follows. 
3'. The natural and logical order to explain any ob- 
scure thing. 
2®. Its two modes. 
1'. Distinctness in intension, and how attained. 
2'. Distinctness in extension, and how attained. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 9 

3®. Primitive notions have no distinctness. 
6^ Solution of examples — e. g §22, p. 25 

1. Apple: red-positive, accidental, original, simple (be- 
cause there is no specific difference. Neither red nor 
any other primary color can be analyzed. It is a 
simple object of vision), common. 

2. Truth is abstract; truthful is concrete. 

7^. Concepts viewed with reference to each other, they are 
considered in reciprocal relations as the same or dif- 
ferent, as containing or contained, as coordinate or 
subordinate. This is the relation of concepts. 
V. The wholes under which mind thinks its objects. 

§23, p. 26 
1*^. The Qualitative or Logical Whole. 
1®. Its character. 
1^ It is entirely subjective, a creation of thought, and 

its parts are separable only by abstraction. 
2^ It is general, and its parts are general. 
3'. Whatever can be said of a concept applies to each 
class and to each individual coming under the 
concept. 
2^ Its kinds. 

1'. Intensive, whose parts are marks. 
2^ Extensive, whose parts are kinds. 
2*^. The Quantitative or Mathematical Whole. .§24, p. 27 
1®. Its character. 
1*. Since it is often determined by an objective reality 
and so corresponds to it, this whole is not so 
entirely subjective. 
2^ Its parts are separable only by dissection. Both 

it and its parts are individual. 
3^ Whatever is said of a quantitative whole is said of 
the whole and does not apply to each individual. 
2^ Its kinds. 
1^ The integral whole. 
1^. Organic whole, as a flower. 
2^. Inorganic whole, as a stone. 
2'. The collective whole. 
2^". How the importance of this distinction is seen. 
1^. Both forms intermingle in our thoughts. 
2^. The principles applicable to reasoning in one of these 
wholes are different from the principles applicable 
to reasoning in the other. 



10 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

3^. Eadical defects in logical theory are due to a neg- 
lect of the distinction. 
3*^. Why the distinction is so generally overlooked. 
1*^. Because every notion is capable of being viewed in 

either whole. 
2^. The transference from one to the other is often very 
easy and takes place almost unconsciously. 
4^^. The wholes further examined. 
1*^. The mathematical whole is individual, not capable 
of division into kinds. 
1®. The individual considered. 
1'. What is an individual ? 
1^. Formally, a unit viewed as a quantity and con- 
sisting of portions severable in thought. 
1^ How the portions are evolved. 
2*^. The character of the parts. 
1^ These parts are neither marks nor kinds, 
2\ But new individuals. 
2®. The kinds of the mathematical whole. 
1'. The integral whole, in which the whole is before 
the parts. 
1^. The sections may be homogeneous, or 
2^. The sections may be heterogeneous. 
2^ The collective whole, in which the parts are before 
the whole. (^ote that quantitative notions, 
while they may be the subjects of qualitative 
propositions, can never be the predicates of such 
propositions.) 

2^ The qualitative whole §25, p. 28 

1®. How notions are related in this whole. 
1^ Eelations in intension. 
1^. Congruent. 
l^ What they are. 

2^. When one congruent notion involves or compre- 
hends others. 
3^. When they are coordinate. 
2^. Incongruent. 

1^. What they are. 
3s. Conflictive. 
1^. These are in opposition. 
2^ Eelations in extension. 

1^. Coextension §26^ p. 30 

1^. When notions are coextensive. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 11 

2^\ From what coextension must be distinguished. 

2s. Subordination §27, p. 30 

1^. When notions are subordinate. 
2\ What a subordinate notion is. 
1\ What species and genus are and in what they 
differ. 
1^. Their relation to classification. 
2^ Genus and species merely relative. 
1^. A subaltern genus — what it is and how char- 
acterized. 
3^. Why a genus is a universal notion or a uni- 
verse, 
l'^. What it is often called. 
4:K What a species is. 
1^. The species as parts make up the genus as a 
whole. 
3**. Solution of some examples §28, p. 32 

1. "The planets,^' a mathematical whole, in- 
dividualized by the definite article. (See 
§24, p. 27.) 

2. Constellation, a collective whole. (See §24, 
p. 28.) 

3^. Coordination §29, p. 33 

1^. How evolved. 

2^. Why in pure logic each genus or universal whole 
can contain only two species. 
1\ How such a division is denominated and what 

the members are. 
2\ What this process is viewed intensively. 
3\ What it is viewed extensively. 
4:\ The rank and the extent of coordinate species. 

3^ :N'egatives §30, p. 34 

1\ How the negative member of the dichotomy is 
characterized. 
1^. What concepts arise from this. 
2^ Their denotation and connotation. 
3^ A notion originally a mere negative of its co- 
ordinate has received a positive mark. 
4K Motions essentially negative. 
2'. The coexistence in thought of correlatives. 
1^ The origin and generalization of all correla- 
tives. 
4*^. Trichotomy and polytomy §31, p. 35 



12 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic, 

IK When such divisions occur. 
1^ The causes from which these arise. 
1^ An abbreviation. 

2^. A lack of a sharp definition of our concepts. 
2\ What the members of such a division are. 
3\ Why a polytomous division can have but one 
strictty negative notion. 
5^. The ground, process, and kinds of division. 

§32, p. 36 
1\ The ground. 
1^ Each division is made with reference to some 
general mark of the genus divided. 
1^. What this is called. 
2*. The several steps in a strict procedure — the 

process. 
3*. The kinds of division. 
1^ A nominal or artificial division. 
1^. One made for some transient purpose. 
2^ To attain a practical end. 
3^ Precursor}^ to a real division. 
4^^. One popularly accepted and useful. 
2K Eeal or scientific division. 
1*". What it proposes. 
2^. What it develops. 

6^ Eules for division §33, p. 38 

1*. But one ground of division. 
1^ Why this should be essential. 
2^. Why it should be important. 
3^ What fixes the ground of an artificial division. 
2\ Members as parts must equal whole divisum. 
1^ Xo one member should exhaust the genus. 
2K Together they should exhaust it. 
3\ The species should emerge immediately from 
the genus. 
1^. Why the genus should be proximate. 
2K To what divisions this rule applies. 
4'. Only one prinx?iple should be used in determin- 
ing a series. 
1^ To what the use of different grounds of di- 
vision gives rise. 
1^. How test a series. 

2^. How any correct trichotomy or polvtomy may 
be ^educed to a dichotomv. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 13 

T"". Solution of some examples §34, p. 39 

1. Dry is a negative notion and is opposed to 
wet or damp. 

2. The correlative of committee is committer. 

3. The tertium quid between far and near is sep- 
arated, removed. 

6 (a). Palm and fingers — incomplete partition 
(back of the hand is omitted) ; flexible and 
expert — incorrect division; right and left — 
correct division. 

4^. Intersection §35, p. 41 

1^. How discovered. 
1'. Definition viewed intensively. 
1^ To what definition primarily refers. 
I''. Having cleared our thought, what renders it 
distinct ? 
2^ What definition is. 
1"^. Of what a logical definition consists. 

3^. Three corollaries §36, p. 41 

1^. Simple notions, why indefinable. 
2^. Why an individual cannot be defined. 
3^. The definition explicates what the notion de- 
fined implicates, and the two are recipro- 
cating or simply convertible concepts. 

2\ Definition viewed extensively §37, p. 42 

1^. When concepts intersect. 

1^. What the common part is. 
2^. Of what the logical definition viewed extensive- 
ly consists. 
1^. Proximate genus. 
2^. Specific difference. 

3\ Forms approximating definition §38, p. 43 

1^ Any predicate consisting of two or more quali- 
tative notions may be viewed as a genus 
with a difference. 
2^- Characterizations. 
1^. Descriptions. 

2^. An accidental mark may set off a notion 
clearly. 
3^. Quasi-definitions. 

4^ Kinds of definitions §39, p. 44 

1^. Eeal definition. 
1^. What it explicates. 



14 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

2^. Its qualities. 
2^ Nominal definition. 
3^. A genetic definition. 

6^ Eules for definition §40, p. 45 

1^ Positive : the definition must always be affirmed 
of the definitnm and be of like quality. 
1^. The function of negative statements. 
2^ Adequate. 

1^. What this means. 
3^ Not tautological. 

1^. What this means. 
4^ Precise. 
1^. What a definition should not contain. 
1'. Nothing merely accidental. 
2^ Nothing superfluous. 

3^ Should not mix names of forms with names 
of things. 
5^ Perspicuous. 
1^. What this means. 
2^. What should be excluded. 

6^ Solution of some examples §41, p. 47 

1. Philosophy: "Science" is the proximate ge- 
nus, "of principles" is the specific difference. 
It is a real definition and is correct. 
22. Circle : "Curved line returning upon itself" 
is the proximate genus, and the remainder of 
the sentence is the specific difference. The 
definition is real and is incorrect. "Return- 
ing upon itself" and "within called the cen- 
ter^^ are superfluous, because the base of a 
cone is a circle, and every point of its circum- 
ference is equidistant from the apex of the 
cone. A circle is not a line, but a plane 
figure. 
S^ System. 

1^. Scheme of intens^'on and extension §42, p. 49 

1^. Their inverse ratio. 

2^. In ascending marks are thought out, classes are 
thought in. 
1®. What this is on the intensive side. 
2®. What it is on the extensive side. 
3^. In descending marks are thought in, classes are 
thought out. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 15 

1®. What this is on the intensive side. 
2®. What this is on the extensive side. 

2°. A modified form of the same scheme §43, p. 49 

3^ The summum genns §44, p. 50 

1^. How characterize this ? 
2"^. Metaphysical and logical analysis of Being. 
3^. The summum genus in science. 
4^. The summum genus in talk. 
1«. Why used. 
1'. When the proximate genus is unknown, or when 

accuracy is not sought. 
2*. As an index of mere existence. 
3^ When an object is considered exclusively with ref- 
erence to some one mark. 
4'. When a mark is to be emphasized. 

4°. The infima species §45, p. 51 

1^. How characterized. 

2"^. How the earlier logicians considered the infima spe- 
cies. 
1®. To what system is restricted in logical theory. 
1^ How far division into logical kinds proceeds. 
3^. The relation of individuals to the logical system. 

§46, p. 52 
1®. Of what this system alone consists — only of classes. 
1^. What follows as to the individual? 
2'. The relation of the individual to classification. 
2®. How the individual differs from the infima species. 
1^ The latter is a class; the former is not a class. 
2^ The latter consists of common marks alone; the 
former has at least one particular mark. 
1^. The individual can be described, but not defined. 
3®. The individual spoken of is the logical individual. 
5°. Relation of division and definition in a system. 

§47, p. 54 
1**. How the two are correlatives. 
P. With what each is concerned. 
2®. What distinctness each gives. 
3®. What each explicates, develops, and analyzes. 
2*^. Their direction in the scale. 
3^. Any system can be expressed in either definition or 

division. 
4^. Defining and dividing sciences. 
5*. Expression of a system. Porphyry^s tree. .§48, p. 56 



16 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic, 

II. This second part is only another aspect of the details. 
The application of the fundamental laws in the first 
part has not been pointed out because it was too obvious. 
A general example will suffice. If any genus (X) be 
divided by dichotomy into its species, A and non-A, 
then the genus X must be affirmed of both these species 
in turn by the Law of Identity — e. g., every A is X, 
and every non-A is X. The species must be denied of 
each other by the Law of Contradiction — e. g., no A is 
non-A. One species being denied of a thing, the other 
must be affirmed by the Law of Excluded Middle, there 
being no middle ground — e. g., whatever is not non-A 
is A. The Laws should never be forgotten, as they are 
the very corner stone, the root of the whole theory of 
thought. 
1*. The proposition. 
1^. What alone limits the form of propositions ?. . §50, p. 59 

2^ The quality of propositions ' §51, p. 59 

l"". What determines the quality of propositions? 
1^. Whether the relation of agreement or disagreement 
between subject and predicate exists, . . .§52, p. 60 
3^. Existence predicated. 
1°. Eelative existence. 
1^. Predication says nothing of the existence of the ob- 
jects compared; it merely assumes it. 
2^. Absolute existence. 
1^. How this is asserted. 

4^ Negative forms §53, p. 61 

1*=. Their kinds. 
1*^. Pure negatives which merely deny one notion of an- 
other. 
1®. Holding back from error. 

2^. The thought of a genus which is denied to the sub- 
ject. 
3®. The reference of both notions to a containing genus. 
4®, The denial of disparate or contrary notions. 
2*. Infinite forms. 

1®. How these differ from pure negatives. 
3^. Impure forms. 
5^. Intensive and extensive forms of propositions. §51, p. 62 
1^ In the intensive judgment the subject is the whole, or 
major term; the predicate is the part, or minor term. 
1"^. The interpretation of the copula. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 17 

2'^. In the extensive judgment the predicate is the whole, 
or major term; the subject is the part, or minor 
term, 
l*^. The interpretation of the copula. 
3^ Why the qualitative judgment may not have an in- 
dividual predicate. 
6^. The Categories of Aristotle and their interpretation. 

§55, p. 63 
1^ What they mean when interpreted as first intentions. 
2". What they mean when interpreted as second intentions. 

7^ The Predicables of Aristotle §56, p. 64 

1^. These are the answer to what question? 

8^. Solution of an example §57, p. 65 

5. To love and be wise cannot be — i. e., cannot coexist. 
Negative, existential, permissible. Or, to love and be 
wise is impossible, affirmative, and permissible. 

9^ Simple Propositions §58, p. 67 

1^. The relations of judgments and propositions. 
1*^. From what a judgment as a product of thought re- 
sults. 
2^. Affirmative judgments. 
1®. How the subject is determined in intensive and in 
extensive judgments. 
2"^. The kinds of simple propositions : 
1^. Conditional propositions. 
2^. Categorical propositions. 
1®. The categorical propositions dissected. . . .§59, p. 68 
1^. Affirmative propositions and their parts. 
2'. Negative propositions and their parts. 
3^ The logical meaning of "Term." 

4'. The copula §60, p. 69 

1^. Its tense. 
2^. Its quality. 

3^. Note the existence of negative subjects and predi- 
cates in affirmative propositions. 

2«. Strict logical order §61, p. 70 

1*. Ehetorical displacements. 
2'. The two logical forms. 

3®. The quantity of proposition §62, p. 71 

1'. The meaning of quantity when applied to proposi- 
tions. 
2*. What determines the quantity of a proposition. 
3^. The division of propositions according to quantity. 
2 



18 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

1^. What indicates the quantity of a proposition. 
1^. When no sign of quantity is prefixed. 

2^. Individual propositions §63, p. 72 

1^. What they are. 

2^. What individualizes a proposition. 
1'. A subject that is a proper noun. 
2\ A subject designated by the definite article or 

any demonstrative or possessive. 
3\ A subject that is a collective whole. 
4\ A subject that is a genus. 
5'. A subject unified by all. 

3^. Universal propositions §64, p. 72 

1^. What they are. 

2^. Why the subject is said to be distributed. 
3^. The predesignations of universality or distribu- 
tion. 
1'. The ambiguity of "all." 

2\ Names of substances, forces, actions, and ab- 
stract terms, usually universal without pre- 
designation. 

4^. Partial or indefinite propositions §65, p. 73 

1^. What they are. 

2*^. Meaning of indefinite some in aflfirmative and 

negative propositions. 
3**. Subject thus qualified is said to be undistributed. 
4^. Predesignations of particular or indefinite prop- 
ositions. 
1\ The significance of any. 
2K Signs that approximate the total. 
1^ Note the difference between the affirmative a 
few and the negative few. 

3*. The ambiguity of some §66, p. 74 

1^ Its divisive sense. 
2K Its indivisive, undistributed sense. 
3^ Its semi-definite sense. 
4*. Scheme of propositional forms combining quantity 

and quality §67, p. 75 

4®. Complex propositions §68, p. 75 

1'. These, when not also compound, involve with the 
principal judgment one or more subordinate 
judgments. 
1^. How the subordinate element appears. 
2'. Subdivision of complex propositions. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 19 

1^. Explicative clauses. 
2^. Restrictive clauses. 
l^ Concessive clauses. 
2^. When a restriction is a condition. 
3'. Complex propositions are treated as simple propo- 
sitions. 
1^. In reducing to strict logical form what is needful. 

5®. Solution of some examples §69, p. 77 

4. Categorical : The live thunder is that which leaps 
among the rattling crags from peak to peak. A, 
individual — integral whole — essentially positive. 
11*. Categorical: Some patriots are not disinter- 
ested, 0, not individual; disinterested is nega- 
tive. 
18*. Categorical : Few, or none, who know me are — 
some who know me are, I, not individual; some 
who know me are not — is a form, according to the 
rule, that few mean some not. But in this exam- 
ple the negative belongs to the qualifier, not to the 
copula. This makes an exception, but it is an 
idiomatic expression, and idioms do not conform 
to rules, grammatical or logical. 

10^ Compound propositions §"^0, p. 79 

1^ What they are. 

2''. Kinds of Compound Propositions. 
1^. Those that are quite obvious. 

2\ Exponibles §71, p. 79 

l^ Their kinds. 
1^ Exclusives. 
2^. Exceptives. 
1^. Note the different meanings of *^ut" and see 2 
Corinthians 4 : 17; 2 Samuel 19: 36 (E. V.). 
2®. How the components differ. 
3®. The difference between exclusives and exceptives — 

Only A is B=all A is B ; no non-A is B. 
All but A is B=no A is B ; all non-A is B. 
4®. Exclusive and exceptive particles. 
1'. What effect when qualifying a definite or semi- 
definite subject? 
2'. What result when qualifying the entire predicate? 
5®. Semi-definite propositions §72, p. 81 



20 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

1^ What these are, how they occur, and the meaning of 

the semi-definite some. 
2^. Why the semi-definite proposition must be denied 
a position among the simple forms. 
1^. Logic proposing a thorough analysis cannot stop 

short of simple forms. 
2^. Simple and compound forms cannot rank as co- 
ordinate. 

3^ Quantified predication §73, p. 82 

1^. The predicate of a simple qualitative proposition has 
no quantity whatever. 
1®. Shown for intensive affirmative and negative propo- 
sitions. 
2®. Shown for extensive affirmative and negative propo- 
sitions. 
2^. When quantity is thought into the predicate, what 
results ? 
1*. Small letter symbols. 
2®. The two views that may be taken of these forms. 

§74, p. 83 
1^ With reference to their origin, they are compound 

qualitative propositions. 
2^ Without reference to their origin, but viewed in 
themselves, they are quantitative propositions. 
1^. Af a considered. 
2^. Negative forms. 
3®. What of a system of a logic built upon the quantifi- 
tion of the predicate? 

3*^. Eule for quantifying the predicate §75, p. 85 

1®. When a quantified predicate is properly spoken of. 
2®. Note that only universals distribute the subject, 
only negatives distribute the predicate. 
4^ Solution of some examples §76, p. 85 

8. Compound, obvious. Some of those who meet here 
are not those who shall part — 0. The snow is that 
which shall be the winding sheet of many who meet 
here — A. 

9. Complex. No fireside, howso'er defended, is with- 
out one vacant chair — E. Here hut means that 
not. It is neither exceptive nor adversative. "How- 
so'er defended" is a concessive clause, excluding the 
possible exception of a defended fireside, ^ thus 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 21 

strengthening the universal negative. What about 
the hut in Acts 4 : 20 ? 
3^ Deduction. 
1^. Immediate inference. 

1^ Deiinition of judgments §77, p. 87 

2'^. Division of judgments. 
1^. Intuition. 
2'^. Inferences defined. 
3*^. Inferences divided. 
1^. Inductive inferences defined. 
2®. Deductive inferences defined and divided. 
1^. Immediate inference defined. 
2^ Mediate inference defined. 
3°. Implication distinguished from inferences. .§78, p. 88 
l*^. Implied judgments. 
1^. Intensive and extensive judgments coexist. 
2®. Correlatives. 
3®. Active and passive forms. 
4®. Incomplete speech. 

5®. Neither compounding two or more simple proposi- 
tions nor resolving a compound proposition is an 
inference. 

4"^. Eule limiting quantification §79, p. 89 

1*^. Violation of this rule is the illicit process. 
5^. Kinds of immediate inference. 

1*^. Determination §80, p. 90 

1®. Adding the same marks to both terms of a proposi- 
tion. 
1'. Guard against using a determinant ambiguously. 
2^. Subtraction of the same mark from both terms, 
while legitimate, is not inference. 
2®. Adding the two terms of a proposition as marks to 

the same concept. 
3®. Combining two propositions. 

2\ Infinitation §81, p. 91 

P. What it is. 

2®. Rule for infinitation. 

3^ Conversion §82, p. 91 

P. What it is. 
2®. Kinds of conversion. 
1*. Simple conversion. 
1^. Transposes terms without change of quantity or 
quality, and is applicable to E and I. 



22 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic, 

2^. Conversion per accidens. 
1^. Eeduces quantity without change of quality, and 
is applicable to A. 
1^. Cannot reverse this step without illicit process. 
1'. If the proposition be afa or ifa, it is converti- 
ble to A. 
2^. What the conversion, per accidens of E is. 
3'. Conversion by contraposition. 
1^. Changes quality, but not quantity, and is applica- 
ble to 0, also to A. 
2^. Eule for contraposition. 
3®. Remarks. 
1*. Whole doctrine of conversion applicable to exten- 
sion. 
2^ Individual propositions, though symbolized by A 
or E, are inconvertible. 

4^ Opposition §83, p. 94 

l^ What it is. 
2^ Its kinds. 
1^ Contradictory opposition. 
1^. Exists between propositions having the same un- 
quantified subject and predicate, but which dif- 
fer both in quality and quantity. 
2s. Rule. 
1^. Of what this rule is a specific statement. 
2'. Contrary opposition. 
1^. Exists between universal propositions differing in 

quality only. 
2s. Rule. 

3^. Contrariety less logical than metaphysical. 
3^ Subcontrary opposition. 
1^. Exists between particular propositions differing in 

quality. 
2^. Rule. 
1*^. The some in the two propositions must be a dif- 
ferent some. 
2^. The modification of the rule if the some be semi- 
definite. 
4^ Subalternate opposition. 
1^. Exists between propositions differing only in 

quantity. 
2^. Rule. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 23 

l'^. This is not strictly opposition, but a specific ap- 
plication of the Law of Identity. 
3®. When the proposition is individual. 

4®. Solution of some examples §84, p. 97 

3. Every honest man whom we meet is a neighbor 

who deserves reward. 
7. Stated in logical form, the proposition is: Some 
studies much vaunted are of little utility — I (it 
is also possible to state it as an existential) ; hence, 
some studies much vaunted are not of much util- 
ity— 0. 

2^ Mediate inference §85, p. 99 

1^. When mediate inference is necessary. 

2°. The intensive syllogism illustrated. 

3°. The extensive syllogism illustrated. 

4*^. Definition of the syllogism. 

5^ Dissection of the syllogism and the parts defined. 

§86, p. 100 
1*^. The three terms. 
l^ The middle term. 
2®. The major term. 
3®. The minor term. 
2^. The premises. 

3^. The order of the propositions is arbitrary, as is also 
the form of three distinct propositions. 

4^. The notations §87, p. 102 

1®. Those applicable to extension. 
1*. The circular, why objectionable. 
2*. The linear and its advantage. 
2®. The radical objection to both circular and linear. 
1*. Being quantities, they transfer thought to the 
mathematical whole. 
3®. That applicable to extension and intension. 
1^. The graphic notation explained. 
6°. The intensive and extensive syllogisms and the rule 

for converting §88, p. 104 

1^. The distinction between these forms examined and 

discarded §89, p. 105 

1®. The distinctions stated. 
l^ The grammatical difference hardly a logical dif- 
ference. 
2'. The external difference lies wholly in transposed 



24 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

premises, and, the order of the premises being 
arbitrary, this is not a logical difference. 
3'. The copula. 
2®. The difference in kind. 
1^ The difference lies wholly in the thought, but it is 
of small logical consequence. 
3®. Points in common. 
1^. Both are mediate inferences through the same 

medium. 
2^ Both reach the same conclusion. 
3^ Formal expression of both is the same. 
4'. The supreme canon and general rules are the same. 
5^ The special rules need only the interchange of the 
words major and minor for adaptation. 
4®. Conclusion as to the distinction. 

T. The syllogistic judgment §90, p. 107 

1*^. What the one syllogistic judgment is. 
2^. How the syllogistic judgment is characterized. 
1®. From what this necessity flows. 
1^ The common distinction between demonstrative and 
moral reasoning. 
8*^. Relative truth or falsity of its several judgments. 

§91, p. 108 
1^. Why logic has no regard for the material truth or 
falsity of syllogistic propositions. 
1®. What would be an improvement. 
2^. Relations of the parts of the syllogism with reference 
to formal truth and falsity. 
1®. The parts summarized. 

9^ Solution of some examples §92, p. 109 

1. "Men of genius" is the major term; "Very unwise 
men" is the minor term; "True poets" is the middle 
P, -^^:M, -^^, S term. All true poets are men of 
—— ^^^ genius; some very unwise men 

are true poets ; hence, some very unwise men are men 
of genius. 
5. Intensive. None who are liable to S:-^^M:^^P 
err are those who are safe from "-^^^^ 
disaster; all men are those who are liable to err; 
hence, no men are safe from dis- P:H^:M,-^^:S 
aster. —"^^^ 

10^ The Canon of the Syllogism §93, p. Ill 

1*. Why the canon is needed. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 26 

2*. Modes of stating the canon. 
1®. Part of a part is part of a whole. 
1^ To what applicable. 
2®. Aristotle's dicta de omni et nullo. 
3®. A less objectionable form stated and explicated. 
4®. The canon of replacement stated and explicated. 
1^ Applicable to immediate inference. 
2'. View taken in this canon of the qualitative syllo- 
gism is peculiar. 
Note. — Correct a statement in the text on page 
113. "It considers one premise as stating a re- 
lation between two notions; the other as stating 
that some new notion is a part of one of them; 
etc." As printed this would not apply when the 
subsumption is negative, as Camestres, Baroco, 
Camenes. 
3^. The application of the several clauses. 

11°. The General Eules of the Syllogism §94, p. 114 

1^. The rules stated and established. 
1®. The syllogism restricted to three terms. 
2®. The syllogism restricted to three propositions. 
3®. The necessity that one premise must be affirmative. 
4®. A negative premise necessitates a negative conclu- 
sion. 
5®. The middle term must be total at least once. 

1'. The ultra-total quantification of the middle term. 
6®. An extreme partial in a premise must be so in the 

conclusion, otherwise illicit process. 
7®. At least one premise must be universal. 
8®. A particular premise necessitates a particular con- 
clusion. 
1^. Why with one premise E and the other I no uni- 
versal conclusion can be drawn? A universal 
conclusion must have its subject universal, and 
this subject must be the subject or the predicate 
of E, the only distributive terms in the two given 
premises. The middle term must be distributed 
once, and that term must be the subject or the 
predicate of E. But since one premise is nega- 
tive — E — the conclusion must be negative, and 
that would distribute the predicate of the con- 
clusion. If one of the terms of E be taken as 
the subject of the conclusion, and the other as 



26 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

the middle term, there is no other distributed 
term in the premises to furnish a universal predi- 
cate for the conclusion. 

2^. Solution of some examples §95, p. 118 

3. The gospel is that which promises salvation to the 
faithful; many whom the world condemns are 
faithful; hence, the gospel is that which promises 
salvation to many whom the world condemns. In 
the sumption "faithful" is a distributed notion, 
meaning "all faithful," and in the conclusion is 
simply replaced by its part, "many whom the world 
condemns." 
8. Few men are entirely unworthy of respect — 0; 
most men are unlearned — I; hence, two particular 
premises, Eule 7; undistributed middle, Bule 5; 
conclusion should be negative, Eule 4; predicate of 
conclusion a fourth term, Eule 1. But if the major 
premise be infinitated, a conclusion can be drawn, 
ultra-total quantification: Most men are worthy of 
respect; most men are unlearned; hence, some un- 
learned men are worthy of respect. 
12^ Figure. 

1^. On what principle are syllogisms divided into figures ? 

§96, p. 120 
1®. What propositions the first figure is fitted to estab- 
lish. 
2®. The second figure, whose conclusion is always nega- 
tive, is adapted to prove what ? 
3®. The third figure, whose conclusion is always particu- 
lar, is always adapted to what purpose ? 
1*. Only in the third figure can the middle term be 
individual. 

13^ The Special Eules of the Syllogism §97, p. 121 

1^. Eules of the first figure. 
1^. The minor premise must be affirmative. 

Both premises cannot be negative, and if the minor 
premise be negative the major premise must be 
affirmative; but if the minor premise be negative 
the conclusion must be negative, and in that case 
the major term — the predicate of the negative 
conclusion — would be distributed in the conclu- 
sion and not in the major premise, where it is the 
predicate of an affirmative premise. That would 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 27 

be illicit major. Since the minor premise cannot 
be negative, it must be affirmative in the first 
figure. 
2^ The major premise must be universal. 

The middle term in the first figure is the subject of 
the major premise and the predicate of the minor 
premise; but it has just been shown that in the 
first figure the minor premise must be affirmative, 
and affirmatives do not distribute the predicate. 
Unless the major premise be universal in the first 
figure, there is undistributed middle. 
2*. Rules of the second figure. 
3*^. Rules of the third figure. 
4^. Rules of the fourth figure. 

5*^. These rules have reference to extension, and to adapt 
them to the intensive syllogism the words major 
and minor must be interchanged. 
14^. The valid moods of the syllogism. 

1^. The grounds of the distribution §98, p. 122 

1®. Why premises IE can yield no conclusion in any 
mood. In I neither term is distributed; but E, 
a negative, makes the conclusion negative, thus 
distributing the predicate of the conclusion, which 
predicate is one of the undistributed terms of I — • 
illicit process. 
2^. The names of the moods. 
1®. The fundamental forms of all reasoning. §99, p. 123 
15*^. Reduction. 
1^ Of two kinds. 

1®. Ostensive reduction explained §100, p. 125 

- 1'. Why there can be no reduction in a syllogism re- 
quiring conversion when the proposition is in- 
dividual. 
2*. General rules for reduction. 

2®. Reductio ad Impossible explained §101? P- 127 

A granted premise is combined with the contra- 
dictory of the conclusion and a conclusion drawn 
contradictory of the other granted premise. 
1'. Why this test is unnecessary. 

Because Baroco (Fakafo) and Bocardo (Fokma- 
fokf) can be reduced ostensively. Take the fol- 
lowing Bocardo and follow the processes indi- 
cated by the small letters : 



28 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic, 

Some M is not P ; all M is S ; hence, some S is not 

P. 
Infinitate the minor premise and transpose the 
premises; contrapone the major premise in Bo- 
cardo and make it the minor premise in the re- 
duced syllogism, Contrapone and then infinitate 
the conclusion of the Bocardo. 
Ferio: No M is non-S; some non-P is M; hence, 
some non-P is not non-S. 
IQ"". The author's objections to the fourth figure. 

§102, p. 128 
1^. The premises are impossible. 
2*^. The procedure in the fourth figure is compound in 

Bramantip, Dimaris, and Camenes. 
3^. In Fesapo and Fresison the conclusion is a corrected 
illicit major. 

17^ Solution of some examples §103, p. 129 

13. The conclusion is: Some profitable exercises are 
abstract studies. The mood is Bramantip; the no- 
tation is P:^^M:^^^'S 

The example reduces to Barbara by transposing the 
premises, and after converting simply the conclu- 
sion of the Bramantip, increasing the quantity of 
the conclusion. This treatment of the conclusion is 
the meaning of p in Bramantip. - 

26. The conclusion is : Some passions are not unright- 
eous. The mood is Bocardo; the notation is 



Test by combining with the minor premise the con- 
tradictory of the conclusion and reach a conclusion 
contradictory of the granted major premise. The 
resulting syllogism will be a Barbara. 
18^ Modified Forms. 

1\ The Enthymeme §104, p. 132 

1®. Its four orders. 
1'. The major premise unexpressed. 
2^ The minor premise unexpressed. 
3*. The conclusion unexpressed. 
4*. Only one judgment expressed. 
1^. An example: 

A just man is one with whom you ought to have 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 29 

nothing to do, as is shown by suffering in 
dreams because of such men; This man is a 
just man, because I have suffered in a dream 
on his account; hence, This man is one with 
whom you ought to have nothing to do. 

2^. The Epichirema §105, p. 134 

1^ Defined. 

2®. The prosyllogism, and episyllogism. 

S\ The Sorites §106, p. 134 

1«. What it is. 

2®. Its two forms, intensive and extensive. 
3®. Five points noted. 
1^ You can have correct reasoning outside of these 
restrictions, but that reasoning will not be a 
Sorites under the accepted definition. 
1^. An example: 

All A is B ; no C is B ; some C is D ; all D is E ; 
hence, Some E is not A. 

4^. Compound and irregular forms §107, p. 136 

1^. When a conclusion is a compound proposition. 

2®. When a premise is compound and the conclusion 

simple. 
3®. Some irregular forms. 

5^ Some methods of argumentation §108, p. 139 

1®. Argumentum ad rem. 
1^ Sources of premises. 
1^. Assumed without proof — petitio principii. 
2^. Granted — argumenti gratia. 
3^. From intuition — a priori. 
4^. From experience — a posteriori. 
1^. Inductions. 
2®. Argumentum a fortiori. 
3®. Argumentum ad verecundiam. 
4^. Argumentum ad judicium. 
5®. Argumentum ad populum. 
6®. Reductio ad ahsurdum. 
1*. Its forms. 
1^. By showing that its contradictory is absurd, that 

its contradictory is self -contradictory. 
2^. That it is contradictory of an axiom. 
7®. Argumentum ad liommem. 
8®. The forms of attack in disproof. 
1^. Directly on the thesis. 



30 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

2*. Against the argument. 

3^ The burden, of proof is on the one who makes an 
assertion, whether that assertion be positive or 
negative. 
6*^. Solution of some examples §109, p. 142 

1. Enthymeme, major premise omitted, Babara. 
Those who obtain mercy are blessed; the merciful 
obtain mercy ; hence, the merciful are blessed. 

5. This may be taken as an enth3rmeme, minor prem- 
ise lacking, Celerent. Those who suffered such 
things are not necessarily sinners above others, for 
I tell you so; These Galileans are those who suf- 
fered such things; hence, These Galileans are not 
necessarily sinners above others. 

It is better, however, to suppose that our Lord took 
the thought in the minds of the people. This was 
an undistributed middle, and he said: "I tell you, 
nay." Sinners are those who suffer such things; 
These Galileans are those who suffered such things ; 
hence. These Galileans are those who were sinners. 
"I tell you, nay." 

8. Epichirema. The Episyllogism is : Whatever tends 
to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low na- 
ture is what deserves to be promoted; Classical 
learning is what tends to withdraw the mind from 
pursuits of a low nature ; hence. Classical learning 
is what deserves to be promoted. 

The prosyllogism proving the minor premise is: 
Whatever cultivates a taste for intellectual enjoy- 
ment is that which tends to withdraw the mind 
from pursuits of a low nature; Classical learning 
is that which cultivates a taste for intellectual en- 
joyment; hence. Classical learning is that which 
tends to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low 
nature. 

16. To go to war is a necessary thing; to go to war 
is to do what will require money; to do what 
will require money is to do what will require taxa- 
tion ; to do what will require taxation is to add to 
the tax on the rich, for the resources of the coun- 
try can stand no other tax ; to add to the tax on the 
rich is to add to the tax on incomes ; hence, to add 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 31 

to the tax on incomes is a necessary thing. This 
is a Eegressive Sorites. 
27. The argument of Demetrius is argumentum ad 
populum. His argument is an appeal (1) to cu- 
pidity, (2) to pride. The town clerk in verse 35 
uses the argumentum ad populum, and in verses 
36-40 the argumentum ad judicium. His argu- 
ment is that the action of the people is (1) dis- 
creditable, (2) unjustifiable, (3) unnecessary, (4) 
dangerous. 
4*. Conditional Propositions. 

l^ The uses of the word "condition". §110, p. 146 

1*^. A real condition — conditio sine qua non, or necessitas 
antecedentis. 
1^. What must here indicates. 

2*. Note a displacement in the text: An occasion may be 
a condition, and may be sine qua non. This should 
come under "first." 
3*^. This primary meaning has reference to reality in 
objects and is therefore metaphysical rather than 
logical. 
2°. A causal condition, causa essendi, or necessitas conse- 
quentis. 
1^. Because of an apparent plurality, the condition is not 
essential or sine qua non. This applies to many 
specific cases. 
2^. Deductive logic not at all concerned either with real 
or with causal conditionals. 
3°. A logical condition, causa cognoscendi, or necessitas 
consequenticB. 
1^ Very often a real or a causal condition or an occa- 
sion is thought merely as a logical condition. 
2^. The inverted real and tlie inverted causal proposition 

furnish logical conditions. 
3<*. Very often in conditional propositions what alone is 

found ? 
4*^. In simple forms the logical condition is never sine 
qua non. In compound forms it so occurs. 
2^. General distribution of conditional propositions. 

§111, p. 147 

1^ The conjunctive proposition §11^? P- 148 

1^ What it is. 

2*. Its clauses or members. 



33 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

1®. The subordinate clause expresses what and is called 

what ? 
2®. The principal clause expresses what and is called 
what? 
3^. The usual form of writing the conjunctive proposi- 
tion. 
4^. Conjunctives of two terms. 

1®. Existential conjunctives. 
5^. Conjunctives involving three terms. 
l^ Some laws in simple sequence touching conjunctives 
involving three terms. 
1'. The consequent only or both clauses may be nega- 
tive and may be particular. 
1^. By simple sequence the author means to exclude 
sequences that would fall in the fourth figure. 
2*. The consequent in 1 (b) must be negative and the 

antecedent must be universal. 
3^ The- consequent in 1 (c) must be particular and the 

antecedent must be affirmative. 
4^ The ground of these laws. 
1^. These conjunctives involve a reasoning; and as 
all reasoning can be reduced to syllogisms, the 
special rules of the figures apply. On critical 
examination it will be found that moods in 
Figures I. and II. can be stated as 1 (a), 
moods in Figures II. and TV. in 1 (b), moods 
in Figures III. and IV. in 1 (c), and moods 
in Figures I. and III. in 1 (d). 
1 (b) with a particular apodosis is Bramantip. 
If all A is B, then some C is A — All A is B; 
(All B is C) ; hence, some C is A. Again, if all 
A is B, then all A is C — 1 (a). Xow convert 
per accident the apodosis, and we have: If all 
A is B, some C is A — 1 (b). The author has 
concluded (§102) that Figure IV. is a com- 
pound process, hence his statement "in simple 
sequence." Also since 1 (a) is in itself a 
reasoning — an enth}Tneme — to convert the con- 
sequent makes a compound, and so he can say 
from his point of view "in simple sequence." 
For instance, 1 (a) is Barbara; and when the 
conclusion is concerted per accidens, the proc- 
ess is double, compound. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 33 

6^. Conjunctives involving four terms. 

2^ The disjunctive proposition §113, p. 149 

1^. Some explications. 
1®. What a disjunctive proposition is. 
2®. Its formula. 

3®. On what condition one clause is affirmed. 
4®. Where the condition lies. 
5®. What the opposed clauses are called, and what their 

relation is. 
6®. What this form of judgment involves, and what it 
implies. 
2'^. When the disjunctive judgments are strictly logical. 
1®. The examples given. 
1*. In the first example the genus divided is conten- 
tions. 
2'. In the second example the genus divided is accused. 
2®. The members are contradictories, and note that con- 
tradictories differ both in quantity and quality. 
3®. The resolution of the disjunctive proposition. 

Either all C is D, or some C is not D. This resolves 
into the four following conjunctives: If all C is 
D, no C is non-D ; if some C is non-D, some C is 
not D; if some C is not D, some C is non-D; if 
no C is non-D, all C is D. It will be noted that 
in this form the apodosis is the protasis infinitated, 
though this is not always the case. 
3^. When the disjunctive judgments are in the form, 
either C is D or M is N. 
1®. The matter of the opposed clauses is entirely dis- 
tinct, and the opposition is mediate. 
2®. The alternative is declared not between members 
directly opposed, but between one of these and a 
consequence of the other. 
3®. Note how frequently disjunctive judgments are in- 
dividual. 
4*^. Modified forms of the disjunctive judgment. 

§114, p. 150 
1®. A series of disparate terms exhaustive and coexclu- 
sive. 
1^ These must be grouped into two opposed members 
for logical treatment. 
2®. Less than all the members of a -disparate series, not 
3 



34 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

being exhaustive, will not yield a disjunctive judg- 
ment. 
1'. Why contraries — any two members of a disparate 
series — cannot as such constitute a disjunctive. 
1^. What is the case when formal contraries are af- 
firmed disjunctively? 
2^. Contraries stated disjunctively as mere alterna- 
tives. 
2'. The copulative judgment is formed from contraries. 
3®. Where the disjunct members are subcontraries. 
1'. The relation of this subcontrary proposition and 
the copulative proposition. 
1^. Rule for inference from the copulative to the sub- 
contrary proposition or vice versa: Sublate the 
whole proposition and each of the copulate or 
disjunct members, changing also the conjunctive 
and to the disjunctive or, or vice versa — e. g., 
ye (cannot=) do not serve both God and mam- 
mon. Hence either ye do serve non-God, or ye 
do serve non-mammon=either ye do not serve 
God, or ye do not serve mammon, e. g.. Jack 
(cannot be=) is not both non-fool and non- 
knave (smart and good). Hence Jack is either 
fool or knave. A is not both B and C (copu- 
lative). Either A is non-B, or it is non-C (sub- 
contrary). Contradictor}^ disjunctives are also 
reducible to copulatives, and vice versa: The 
prisoner is either guilty or not guilty. Then the 
prisoner cannot be both guilty and not guilty. 
The vice versa means that contrary back to its 
contradictory. 
4®. Disjunctive, or in general conditional judgments, al- 
ways affirm, are always positive, never negative. 
1'. Where denial is possible, how it is effected. 
1^. Where neither . . . nor is used there is a double 
denial, a negative categorical compound, not a 
disjunctive proposition. 
1^. While either . . . or are signs of disjunction, 
neither . . . nor are not at all disjunctive, 
but are the proper denial of contrary clis- 
junctives (page 151) and subcontrary dis- 
junctives; hence they imply these. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 35 

3''. The dilemmatic or conjunctivo-disjunctive proposition. 

§115, p. 153 
1'^. The genesis of these propositions. 
1®. A disparate series transformed by a supposition. 
2«. Definition. 

Note that the form of the proposition given in §111 
is faulty, because disjunctive contradictories (ab- 
solute) have no condition. C is either D or non- 
D without any need of reference to if A be B — 
e. g., if an egg be good, it will either sink or swim. 
But it makes no difference whether it be good or 
not, it will either sink or swim. The disjunct 
members must be contraries or subcontraries, or 
else contradictories under a logical universe (pages 
10, 31, 149). Take this disparate series: A is 
either B or C or D ; but A is not B. Then if A 
be not B, A is either C or D. The condition, the 
tertium quid, is denied. 
3®. Possible forms of the conjunctivo-disjunctive prop- 
osition. 
3^^. Interpretation of the conjunctive proposition. 

§116, p. 153 
l"". Conjunctive proposition the basis of the conditional 

forms. 
2^. When the conjunctive is thought as a qualified prop- 
osition. 
3^. Mere implications (§78) are often expressed condi- 
tionally, also qualifications — e. g., if a man be under 
oath, he is qualified to testify. 
4^. When a reasoning is implied. 
1*^. Observe that the clauses, either positive or negative, 

are neither affirmed nor denied. 
2^"^. The clauses are posited not really, but ideally. 
3^*. The proposition as a whole is always and only af- 
firmative. 
1®. What, then, is affirmed? 
1'. Merely a relation between the members, a relation 
of dependence, the relation of sequence which is 
the syllogistic judgment (see page 90). 
4^. Why the conjunctive proposition is an enthymeme. 
1^. All the various forms of inference are implied by 
conjunctive propositions. 
1'. Immediate inferencie. . 



36 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

Note that "clauses" and "terms" are not the same. 
2^ Mediate inference. 

4^ Solution of some examples §11'^? P- 155 

4. Only if he happened to be there, then (I know that) 
you surely met him. In this compound form the 
logical condition is sine qua non, §110, 3d. In this 
example an occasion is thought as a logical condition. 
7. Conjunctive proposition in the form 1 (a), If A be B, 
A is C. If any among you be afflicted, then let any 
among you pray, §112. (One clause is interroga- 
tive, the other imperative. Note the conditional in- 
version in. the protasis. But in the original, "Is any 
among you afflicted? Let," etc. — an independent 
sentence. ) 

14. A disjunctive mediate contrary proposition (the 
tertium quid is indirectly asserted not to exist, page 
151) in the form. Either C is D or C is M. The first 
part is dilemmatic, the second is conjunctive in. tlie 
form 1 (a), and the apodosis of this conjunctive con- 
tains a double denial — Either (if A be B, A is either 
C or non-C), or (if A be X, A is neither C nor non- 
C). In the first part C and non-C are contradic- 
tories, and A belongs to the genus whose species are 
C and non-C. In the second part C and non-C are 
also contradictories; but A does not belong to the 
genus whose species are C and non-C. 

27. A simple dilemmatic proposition in the form. Sim- 
ple (b). Either I shall be checkmated at the next 
move, or my chess king must not be moved, or he must 
not be covered, or I must not capture the attacking 
piece. Either A is or B is or C is. Question A, and 
then if A be not, either B is or C is. This can be 
thrown into the form. Either if B is, A is not; or if 
C is, A is not. Take the example on page 152 : 
Either if an angle be right, it is not acute; or if it 
be obtuse, it is not acute. Here "right" and "obtuse" 
are contraries actually, but contradictories if re- 
garded as species of the genus non-acute. In our ex- 
ample the clauses seem to be subcontraries. If they 
be subcontraries, the example does not conform to 
the definition of "disparates" given on page 36. Or 
seems to be equivalent to and, hence I have worked 
by "a sort of contraposition" (page 152),. If or be 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 37 

equivalent to and, is the example anything more than 
a triple conjunctive? It is really a trilemma. It is 
not a case under this general description. It should 
be in the next chapter. The subsumption would be, 
Either I must cover, or I must capture the attacking 
piece, or I shall be checkmated at the next move. 
Change the two ors to ands. After chess king in- 
sert "being in check." 
5*. Conditional syllogisms. 
l^ Eeasonings founded on conditional forms. .§118, p. 158 
In the first example the phrase "If the using of credit 
be a demand for goods" is a condition of the major 
premise and must be carried into the conclusion of the 
Barbara. On the stated condition, All forms of credit 
are what affect prices; bills of exchange are a form 
of credit. Hence, on the stated condition, bills of 
exchange are what affect prices. 
The third example can be stated thus: Those who are 
either saints or philosophers are rare; those rulers 
who so conduct themselves are either saints or philoso- 
phers. Hence, those rulers who so conduct themselves 
are rare. 
2''. Recognized conditional syllogisms. 

1^ The conjunctive syllogism §119, p. 159 

1\ What it is. 
2^. Its axioms. 
1®. How the protasis should be expressed if it be a sine 
qua non. 
3^. Its moods. 

For an interesting conjunctive syllogism in modus 
tollens, see Psalm && : 18-20. Instead of the for- 
mal conclusion, see what we have. "I looked," 
said Fuller, "that he should have clapped the crown 
on his own, and he puts it on God's head." 
4^. Its rules. 
1®. What contradiction is when the subject is individual 

or a generic total. 
2®. How the moods are mutually reducible. Note that 

this process is justified by axiom 2, page 159. 
3®. How it is usual to state the argument in reductio 
ad ahsiirdnm. See for an example 1 John 1 : 10. 
4®. Sometimes, generally for the sake of emphatic af- 
firmation, the protasis is a mere truism or an evi- 



38 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

dent or admitted truth, in which case the ponent 
mood is so obvious that it is not expressed — e. g., 
if a man be mortal, Socrates was mortal. If 3 
plus 1 equal 4, then 2 plus 2 equal 4. (N. B. — 
3 plus 1 is the definition of 4.) If there be any 
(some) truth in history, Socrates lived and suf- 
fered. This is a variety of reductio ad ahsurdum; 
for the contradictory of the protasis being absurd, 
it must be true. So far from doubt being ex- 
pressed by these conditional forms, it is expressly 
excluded. 

2^ The disjunctive syllogism §120, p. 161 

1^ What it is. 
2^. Its axioms. 
3^. Its moods. 
1®. The sumption always afl&rms. 
2^. The quality and quantity of the conclusion. 
4*^. When the disjunction is subcontrary. 

1®. Why in this case only the ponent mood can be used. 
5^. The copulative syllogism. 
1^. Why in this case only the tollent mood can be used. 

3^ The conjunctivo-disjunctive syllogism §121, p. 163 

1^. Viewed conjunctively. 

1®. In this case treated as a conjunctive proposition. 
2^. Viewed disjunctively. 
1^. In this case treated as a disjunctive proposition. " 
1^ The two disjunct members, originally contraries, 
being reduced to contradictories by the stated 
condition, yield also two disjunctive forms in 
Modus Ponendo Tollens (§114) — e. g., if an 
angle be not right, either it is acute or obtuse; 
but it is acute; hence, it is not obtuse. This is 
simply the disjunctive syllogism in Modus Po- 
nendo Tollens. The affirmation of either denies 
the other, regardless of the condition. 
2'. N'either of the forms of the conjunctivo-disjunctive 
syllogism is a dilemma. 

4^ The dilemma §122, p. 163 

1^ The definition. 

2*^. The essential difference between the conjunctivo-dis- 
junctive syllogism and the dilemma is the dis- 
junct subsumption in the dilenima. 
3'*. Its forms. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 39 

1®. Simple constructive. 
2®. Complex. 
1^ Complex constructive. 
2^ Complex destructive. 
4^. Why there cannot be both a simple constructive and 
a simple destructive dilemma. 
Contrapone the sumption in the simple constructive 
form given in the text and treat it in tollens, and 
this results: If C be not D, A is not B; and if C 
be not D, E is not F. But A is B or E is F, hence 
C is D. 
Let A=C, B=not D, D=not B, F=not F; then if 
A be B, C is D; and if A be B, E is F; but C is 
not D or E is not F. Hence A is not B. 
Now note that this is the form given on page 165 and 
is simple destructive. Take this example : If A is, 
B is ; A is, hence B is. Modus ponens. 
Contrapone, and this results : If B is not, A is not ; 

A is, hence B is. Modus tollens. 
To treat a proposition in ponens and then to treat 
its contraponed form in tollens is to do the same 
thing. The reasoning in each case is the same. 
Hence this form cannot be accepted as additional 
to those given, because it is the same as 1, page 
164, and only slightly disguised by a rearrange- 
ment after contraposition of the letters in alpha- 
betical order. Truly this is a simple destructive 
dilemma, which is to say that a simple dilemma 
may appear either in the destructive or in the con- 
structive form; but since these are essentially the 
same, both should not be reckoned. 

5". Criticism and estimate of the forms §1^3, p. 165 

1^. Why they are not inferences. 
1^. Why they are not mediate inferences. 
1^ The essential feature of a syllogism is a middle 

term, but here is no middle term. 
2'. The number of terms. 
1^. There are four terms, and all are in the major 
premise. 
3'. The so-called minor premise introduces no new 
matter and has nothing in common with the con- 
clusion. 
2®. Why they are not immediate inferences. 



40 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

1*. Where an immediate inference is indirectly in- 
volved. 
2*. What these forms express primarily. 

1®. What the process is. 
3^. Why these forms should not be banished from logic. 
1®. They are true, natural, and common modes of 

thought. 
2®. They present exceedingly condensed expressions 
through which thought rapidly darts. 
4*^. The nomenclature should be changed. 

3^ The solution of some examples §124, p. 168 

4. Mohammed was either an enthusiast or an impostor ; 
but he was an enthusiast, hence he was not an im- 
postor. A disjunctive syllogism in modus ponendo 
tollens. The conclusion does not follow, for he might 
have been both. This is a subcontrary disjunctive and 
cannot conclude in the tollent mood. If the sump- 
tion be between contradictories, then it is good. 
7. Or=and if. This is not a fortiori, but two conjunc- 
tives, giving a cumulative argument. Hence for two 
good reasons logic should be studied. 
14. A simple constructive dilemma, ponens. Xotice the 
also. See 2 Kings 17: 3, 4. 
6^. Quantitative forms. 
l^ The difference between kind and degree. .§125, p. 171 
1*^. In the qualitative whole the thought is fundamentally 

of marks. 
2*'. In the quantitative whole the thought is fundamentally 
of magnitudes. 
1^. How a quantity is distinguished from a quality. 
1®. Measurable by some standard of measure. 
2®. Magnitudes of the same kind differ in degree, and 
the notion of degree is quantitative. 
3^. Distinction between kind and degree is fundamental 
and thoroughgoing. 
2^. Quantitative notions common and proper.. §126, p. 171 
l'^. From its name alone, a common noun, it is often im- 
possible to decide whether a notion is qualitative or 
quantitative — e. g., "Our white population" is a 
class ; "the center of population" is a mass. 
1^. Unless determined by the context, the thought may 
be either quantitative or qualitative. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 41 

2^ What designates individuals and generally (§17) 
makes the thought quantitative? 

3^ The kinds of judgments of degree §1^7, p. 172 

1^ Judgments of equality. 
1"^. The meaning of the copula. 
1®. It is necessary to distinguish equality and identity. 
2*^. Judgments of inequality. 
1*^. To what axiom it conforms. 
2*^. The meaning of the copula. 

3^. With what other notions this simple relation is often 
confounded. 
3"^. The individual and the quantitative whole. 
1^. In the qualitative whole the individual cannot be- 
come a predicate. 
1®. What follows as to the conversion of the individual 
proposition. 
2^. In the quantitative whole an individual is often the 
predicate. 
1®. What follows as to the conversion of the quantita- 
tive proposition. 
4°. How determine whether a proposition is quantitative ? 
5^ The complete generality of many quantitative forms 
should be observed. 
4^. Inference in the quantitative whole. 
1^ Immediate inference from equivalent propositions. 

§128, p. 174 
1^. Its canon. 
1®. To what this process corresponds. 
2^. In modified form the principle applies to proposi- 
tions of inequality. 
2^ Mediate inference in quantitative thought. 
1*^. Mediate inference from equivalent propositions. 

§129, p. 175 
1®. Its canon. 

1^ Of what this is a specific application. 
2®. The logical function of standards of measure. 
1^. They furnish media through which we are able to 
compare quantitives which cannot be immediately 
compared. 
3®. Matters of indifference in the syllogism of equiva- 
lence. 
1^ Order of premises. 
2^ Order of subject and predicate. 



42 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

3^ Distinction of major and minor terms and prem- 
ises. 
4^. Doctrine of conversion no place in these syllogisms. 
5^. Figure of no moment. 
6^ Moods reduced to two, positive and negative. 

4«. Geometrical example §130, p. 177 

1^ The complete generality of these examples. 
1^. Passing from words to symbols is not a generali- 
zation nor an induction, but simply a transla- 
tion of expression. 
2^. The reverse is not a deduction. 
2^. Mediate inference from propositions of inequality. 

§131, p. 178 
1®. Its canon. 
1^. Syllogisms in conformity with this canon may be 
called partitive s3dlogisms. 
2®. Another modification of the axiom. 
1^ What syllogisms conforming to this canon may be 

called. 
2^ A superficial distinction. 
3^. The a fortiori conclusion, 
3^. Why a proposition whose terms are in strict identity 
cannot serve as a premise. 

5^ Solution of some examples §132, p. 180 

2. a. Quantitative, entire identity: George Eliot is the 

same as Mrs. Lewes. 
h. Quantitative, comparative: The speed of arrows is 
greater than the speed of eagles. 
10. The market value of my cloak is equal to $15 ; the 
market value of a sword is less than $15, since it is 
only $10. Hence the market value of a sword is less 
than the market value of my cloak. 
15. The ground covered by the dome is part of the ground 
covered by the sky; the ground covered by the altar 
is part of the ground covered by the dome. Hence 
the ground covered by the altar is part of the ground 
covered by the sky. This is a partitive svllogism. 
There is also another thought in the example which 
you should bring out in syllogistic form. 
ITT. Fallacies. 

l^ Definition .§133, p. 183 

1''. What originally determines logical forms. 
2^ What come under thi? wide definition. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 43 

2*. Two needed remarks. 
I''. Logical forms, though necessary, are violable. 
2^. What does not violate logical law, however false in mat- 
ter, is not a fallacy. 
1^. Overlooking this, what many logicians have included 
among fallacies. 
3^ Distribution of fallacies. 

l^ Paralogisms §134, p. 184 

1^ Definition. 

2\ Paradox. 

3''. Fallacious conversion. 

4^. Inference through undistributed middle, or an illicit 

process. 
5^. Sometimes the law is not really, only apparently vio- 
lated. 
2'^. Sophisms. 

1^ Sophisms in diction §135, p. 185 

1^. What is required to discover the formal fault. 
1®. How terms repeated ambiguously must be dealt 
with and why. 
1^. Syllogisms containing such terms are quaternions. 
2^. Distribution of sophisms in diction. 

P. Equivocation §136, p. 185 

1^ This is the use of a term in two different senses. 

2'. Perhaps the most prolific fallacy. 

3'. The only security. 

4'. The paronomasia, or pun. 

2«. Amphiboly §137, p; 186 

.1'. How it differs from Equivocation. In the con- 
struction of a sentence rather than a term. Il- 
lustrations of this fallacy are such as the follow- 
ing : Thank you for your book. I'll lose no time 
in reading it. 

3®. Composition and Division . §138, p. 187 

l^ What this fallacy is: conjoining what has been dis- 
joined, and disjoining what has been conjoined. 
1^. Aristotle's treatment of this fallacy. 
2^ The distinction between Composition and Division 
and Amphiboly. 
1^. Ambiguities wrongly resolved by punctuation. 
Take the following from a Scotch sermon: "Only 
last Sabbath, my friends, a young man died in 
this parish very suddenly while I was endeavor- 



44 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

ing to preach the word in a state of beastly in- 
toxication." 
A newspaper with the following introduction pub- 
lished some verses : "The following verses were 
written, more than fifty years ago by a gentle- 
man who has for fifteen years lain in his grave 
for his own amusement." 

4«. Accent §139, p. 188 

1*. This fallacy resolves an ambiguity by a stress of 
voice, so as to mislead, generally by an implica- 
tion. 
1^. Sarcasm, how generally indicated. 

5«. Figure of speech §140, p. 189 

1'. This occurs when a figure of speech is construed 
literally, or vice versa. 
1^. Why this is such a fertile fallacy. 
2^. Solecisms, or perversions or improprieties of lan- 
guage, are included here. 
2^. Sophisms in matter. 
1**. What they are : Such as require an inspection of the 
matter in order to detect the formal fault. 

§141, p. 190 
1®. What they are commonly called and why. 
2^. Distribution of sophisms in matter. 

1«. Accident §142, p. 190 

1^ This arises from equating subject and accident, or 
whenever it is assumed that subject and accident 
have all their attributes in common. 
1^. What Aristotle meant by accident. With him it 
includes everything which is distinguishable 
from the subject in any way and at the same 
time predicable of it — everything except the 
definition, which conjoins Genus and Differen- 
tia together, and is thus identical and converti- 
ble with the definitum. 

2«. Secundum quid. . .' §143, p. 191 

1'. This is a confusion of an absolute statement with 
one limited in time, manner, or some accidental 
relation. 
1^. What the first infers, and how it may be con- 
strued. 
2^. What the second infers, and how it may be con- 
strued. 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 45 

3«. Ignoratia elenchi §144, p. 192 

1^ What it is. 
1^. Ignoring the refutation. 
2s. Answering to the wrong point. 
3^. Proving something not the contradictory of the 
thesis which one intends to overthrow. 
2^ What it supposes. 

1^. A disputant, an attempt at' confutation. 
3^ The wider view usually taken. 
4^ In what the formal fault lies. 
1^. In establishing something that is not the required 

contradictory of the thesis; 
2^. Or else establishing something that is not the re- 
quired thesis: one term at least of the conclu- 
sion not occurring in either premise. 

4«. Consequent §145, p. 193 

1^ What it is. 
1^. To infer the falsity of the conclusion because a 

premise is false, or the argument unsound. 
2^. To infer the truth of a premise from that of the 
conclusion. 
2'. Putting these fallacies in hypothetical form, one 
proceeds from the denial of the antecedent to the 
denial of the consequent; the other from the af- 
firmation of the consequent to the affirmation of 
the antecedent. 
1^. These two conditional fallacies are identical re- 
spectively with illicit process and undistributed 
middle. 
3^ How this fallacy differs from Accident. 
1^. This is not essentially distinguishable from Acci- 
dent, being nothing more than a peculiar spe- 
cies or variety thereof, as Aristotle himself ad- 
mits. 

5«. Petitio Principii §146, p. 194 

1'. What it is. 
1®. The assumption, as a ground of proof, of a prop- 
osition that is not proved, or not granted, or not 
self-evident. 
2^ In what ways it may occur. 
1^. When the very thing to be proved is assumed. 
1^. This may be concealed by using synonyms, or a 



46 Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 

name and its definition, either directly or in 
a circumlocution. 
2^. Its two varieties. 
1'. Hysteron proteron, or the last first. 
1^ This does not go beyond an epithet, or a single 

proposition, or an inference. 
2^. The formal fault of hysteron proteron when 
syllogistic. 
1^. Only two terms. 
2\ Diallelon, or the logical circle. 
1^ This occurs when a premise is repeated in a 
more remote conclusion. 
2^. When a particular is to be proved and a universal 

is assumed without warrant. 
3^. When a universal is to be proved and a particular 

contained under it is assumed. 
4^. When the problem to be proved is divided and its 

parts assumed in detail. 
5^. When two facts are reciprocally implicated and 
one is assumed to prove the other. 

6®. Non causa pro causa §147, p. 196 

1^. What it is. 
1^. Assuming a premise which is not the cause to be 
the cause of an absurd conclusion. The conclu- 
sion may be a proper sequence and its absurdity 
justify the contradiction of a premise, but. not 
of the one assumed — e. g., not being a bird, I 
cannot be in two places at once. 
1^. How detect the fallacy. 
2^ An erroneous view of this fallacy. 
1^. To suppose that it relates to causa essendi, and 
not to causa cognoscendi, or reason only. 

7®. Plures Interrogationes §148, p. 197 

1*. What this is. 
1^. A call for a single answer to plural questions. 

3^. Solution of some examples §149, p. 198 

3. This is in form the First Figure. The major prem- 
ise is an A, the minor premise is an E. In the First 
Figure the minor premise must be affirmative. The 
example is illicit major. 
15. This is a correct conjunctive 1 (a) proposition. If 
you are one who never does an5^hing you need be 
ashamed of, then you are one who need . never be 



Analysis of Elements of Deductive Logic. 47 

ashamed of anything you do. No actions which you 
do are actions which you need be ashamed of— E. 
Convert this simply: No actions which you need be 
ashamed of are actions which you do — E. 

28. Whoever necessarily goes or stays is not a free agent. 
This is granted, and "goes or stays" is used dis- 
tributively. In the minor premise "goes or stays" is 
used collectively. In this view we have the fallacy of 
composition. The minor premise conjoins what 
should be disjoined. In the major premise "neces- 
sarily goes or stays" is equivalent to "goes under 
compulsion or stays under compulsion" ; in the minor 
premise the disjunction is what is said to be necessary. 
To say that one must go, or that he must stay, is very 
different from saying that he must do one of the two ; 
hence ambiguous middle. "Necessarily" in the major 
premise may be taken as modifying "goes," "stays" 
separately. In the minor premise "necessarily" modi- 
fies the entire clause "either goes or stays." This 
seems to be amphiboly, "or" being conjunctive in the 
major premise and disjunctive in the minor premise. 

41. Everything most beautiful is what must be found in 
the gods. The human form is most beautiful ; hence 
the human form is what must be found in the gods. 
The major premise is an absolute statement, one made 
without restriction (simpliciter) . The minor prem- 
ise is a statement limited (a dicta secundum quid) 
to material forms. As used by the Epicureans this 
may have been the Fallacy of Accent. 



ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

Physiological. 
I. Introduction. 

l^ Psychology and Physiology §1> P- 1 

2^ The Senses §3 

1^. Their general distribution. 
1^. The sensus fixus. 
1^. Its characteristic — has local organs. 
2^. Division of sensus fixus. 
1®. The cephalic senses. 
1^ Why so named. 
2-. Their distribution. 
1^. The two subjective senses, and what predominates. 
2^. The two objective senses, and what predominates. 
2®. The somatic senses. 
1^ Why so named. 
2'. Their distribution. 
1^. Which the more subjective or sensuous. 
2^. Which the more objective or percipient. 
2*=. The sensus vagus. 
1^. That is almost wholly subjective. 
2^. Special discussion of sensus fixus. 
1^. Cephalic senses examined. 
1^. In the order of increasing objectivity. 

1«. The organ of smell §3, p. 2 

1^ Its position and nerve supply. 
2'. How and by what excited. 

3'. A marked experience in its exercise §4? P- 3 

4'. What is at a maximum. 

5^ Percipient power, how improved. 

6'. What the combined sensation and perception is. 

§5, p. 4 
7'. What the object perceived, the percept is. 
1^. What odor is, in the common judgment of men. 
2^. What is the material thing that directly excites 

the sense-perception of smell p. 4 

1^. What is universally allowed. 

2^. What is the proximate cause of the affection. 

3^. What important conclusion follows §6, p. 5 

8'. What the sense of smell gives. 
1^. The existence of body having this one quality, 

odor. 
(48) 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 49 

9'. What the sense of smell does not give. 
1^. Does not give body as having either extension or 

place. 
2^. Does not localize its percept. 

2«. The organ of taste §7, p. 5 

1^ Its position and nerve supply. 

2^ How and by what excited p. 6 

3'. What marked experience in its exercise. 

4^ What the impression called taste involves. .§8, p. 6 

5^ What is the percept of taste. 

6^ The analogies of smell and taste §9> P- '<' 

1^. Position of the outer organs. 
2^. Solution of excitants. 
1^. What these are. 
2^. The resulting discrimination. 
3^. Both highly sensuous and feebly perceptive. 
4^. Sympathy between the two. 

3«. The organ of hearing §10, p. 7 

1^ How and by what excited. 
2^ A marked experience in its exercise. 
1^. More perceptive or objective than sensuous or sub- 
jective §11, p. 8 

2^. Enjoyment of music but slightly sensuous. 

3^ What the percept of hearing is §12, p. 8 

1^. Not consciously located at all §13, p. 9 

2^. Proof that sound is an intracranial phenomenon. 

§14, p. 9 

4«. The organ of sight. §15, p. 10 

1^ The eyeball described. 

2'. A marked experience in the exercise of sight. 
1^. Sight the most objective of the senses. .§16, p. 10 
2^. The sensations attending its exercise. 
3^. The perceptions of sight. 
1\ The primary percept of sight is color. .§17, p. 11 
1*. Color psychologically considered. 

1^ How proved to be intracranial §18, p. 12 

2^. The secondary percept of sight is extension. 

§19, p. 13 
1^ How proved. 
2\ How interpreted. 
1^ Of what the consciousness of colored figure is 
the empirical occasion. 
4 



50 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

2K What is perceived in the changing of visible 
figure. 

3^ The analogies of hearing and seeing §20, p. 14 

1^. In external conditions. 

2^. In organs. 

3^. In the impressibilit}^ of nerve ramifications. 

4^. Both highly perceptive and feebly sensuous. 

5^. Similarity of their sensations. 

6^. Similarity of their perceptions. 

7^. Their power of analysis as to time and space. 

2*. The percept of the cephalic senses §-1^ P- 15 

1®. An excited sensory, the brain itself. 
1^. Secondary qualities of body — what they are. 

2^ Importance of this fact p. 16 

1^. Eelation to Idealism and Materialism. 
3'. How relieve the difiiculty of conceiving the fact. 
2''. The Somatic senses examined. 

1^. The organ of the sense of touch §22, p. 17 

1®. Of what it consists. 
1^ The dermis and its functions. 
2'. The epidermis and its functions. 
2®. Difference of the skin as to perception and sensa- 
tion §23, p. 18 

3®. The perceptions of touch. 
1'. The primary percept is tangibility. 
1^. Modified forms which must be added to this per- 
cept. 

2'. The secondary percept §24, p. 19 

1^. In what this secondary percept is implied. 
2^. To what this extension herein given belongs. 
1*^. The exact place touched is not consciously given. 
3'. Other percepts commonlv attributed to touch. 

§25, p. 20 

2^. The organ of the muscular sense §26, p. 20 

1®. Its physiology given. 

2®. An instance of pure muscular sense §27, p. 21 

1^ How the sensation is marked. 
3®. The percept of the muscular sense. 

1'. What modifications we must also add p. 21 

4®. The difference of the organ as to perception and 

sensation. 
5®. Some illustrations of the special importance of this 
sense §28, p. 21 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 51 

1'. Bodily movements p. 22 

2^ Estimate of weight and distance p. 22 

3'. Power of articulate speech largely. 
4'. Muscular tension. 

3''. Discussion of the sensus vagus §29, p. 23 

1\ What this is. 

2°. Almost wholly subjective. 

3°. Desires discriminated. 

4°. Heat and cold probably not sensus vagus p. 24 

5". Physical pain. 
4^. How the knowledge given us by the senses is supple- 
mented §30, p. 25 

n. The Nervous Organism. 

1*. The two nervous organisms distinguished by physiolo- 
gists §31, p. 26 

I''. The sympathetic system, 
1*^. To what related specially. 
2^. What it influences generally. 

2^ The cerebro-spinal system §32, p. 26 

l'^. Of what this consists. 
l*^. The cerebro-spinal axis. 

2^. Nerves branching from the cerebro-spinal axis. 
1®. Distribution of these nerves. 
1^ The afferent nerves and their function. 
2^ The efferent nerves and their function. 

2^ The cerebral nerves §33, p. 27 

1'. Their number. 

3«. The spinal cord §34, p. 27 

1'. The spinal nerves. 
1^. Their number and connections. 
2^. The circuit of voluntary locomotion explained. 

§35, p. 28 

3^. Involuntary or automatic motion §36, p. 28 

1^. The interpretation of this. 
2**. What this is called — reflex action. 
1'. Reflex action defined. 
1^. By what ganglia determined. 
2^ What these reflex actions are. 
3^. The effect of repetition on voluntary activity. 

§37, p. 29 
1*. What this is — muscular education. 
2*. When these actions are well performed. 
3^ The relation of volition to these actions. 



52 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

4:K The relation of consciousness to these actions. 
4^. What phenomena reflex actions explain. 
3^. The brain. 

P. Its anatomy §38, p. 31 

2®. The white and gray matter, their function and con- 
nection , §39, p. 31 

1^ What this anatomical disposition seems to indicate. 

§40, p. 32 
1^. The three zones of the cerebrum and their func- 
tion. 

3®. The reflex action of brain centers §41, p. 33 

1^ What hypothesis this is — unconscious cerebration. 
2'. The phenomena it explains. 
4®. The questions belonging to physiological psychology 

and its relation to psj^chology §42, p. 35 

1^ Physiological psychology considered. 
1^, Preceding discussion mainly physiological. 

§43, p. 35 
2^. Physiological psychology widely described and 

more accurate!}^ defined. 
3^. How the phrase is commonly understood. 

4^. Historical notices §44, p. 36 

l^ The subject divided §45, p. 37 

1*. Psycho physics. 
1^ Weber's law. 
2K Fechner's law. 
l'^. The unit of sensation. 

2^^. The threshold of consciousness, the zero 
point. 

3^ The value of Fechner's law §46, p. 39 

2^ Psychometry §47, p. 40 

1^. Time of neural action. 
2K Eeaction time. 
1^. Its three parts. 
1'. Efforts to analyze psychic time. 
2\ Measure of discernment time. 
3^ Time to reproduce ideas by memory. 
4}. Time requisite to a logical process. 
2K Limitations of phvsiological psychology. 

§48, p. 42 
1*. Cannot occupy chief position in science of mind. 
1^. The possible measurable quantities. 
1^. Because of the character of the unit of sen- 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 53 

sation, measurement of intensity very 
doubtful. 
2^ Because of the possibility that the so-called 
psychic interval may be cerebral, measure- 
ment of duration defective. 
2^. Cannot approach higher powers of mind by 

such experimentation. 
3^ Cannot pronounce these efforts useless. 
3^. Eelation of pure to mixed psychology. 

§49, p. 44 
1^ The sphere of each of these sciences. 
1^ Pure psychology strictly a subjective science. 
2K Pure physiology strictly an objective science. 
2'. The correlation of the two. 
3^ Perfect analysis of either cannot explain, the 

other. 
4'. Upon what fact mixed psychology relies. 
5*. Combination of the two distinct sciences im- 
plies a knowledge of each. 

Psychology. 

ITT. Consciousness. 

l^ Definitions §50, p. 47 

l'^. Psychology. 
1°. Science. 

1*^. I^inds of science. 
2"=. Phenomenon. 
2*^. Substance. 
1°. Its kinds. 
1"^. Matter defined. 
2^. Mind defined. 
2^ How it is conceived. 
3^., The qualities inhering in different kinds, 
l*^. The essential and defining qualities of its different 
kinds. 
4°. Insufficiency of this a priori definition. 
5°. The so-called a posteriori definition. 

3''. Psychological distinctions §51, p. 52 

V. The most thoroughgoing, 
l*^. With what the ego is identical. 
2*^. With what the non-ego is identical. 
3*^. Distinction between the ego and its conscious modes. 



54 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

2"". Another thoroughgoing distinction §52, p. 53 

1*^. Subject defined. 

1®. Subjective defined. 
2\ Object defined. 
l^ Objective defined. 
2®. The subject-object. 
3^ The object-object. 

4^ Power §53, p. 55 

1*". Its definition. 
2^ Its classification. 
1^. The active powers or faculties. 
2*. The passive powers or capacities. 
3^. Potential or virtual existence. 

4^. What would be a better psychological nomenclature, 
and why. 
2*. General view of consciousness. 
l**. The primary and fundamental truth of psychology. 

§54, p. 56 
2**. The most important point to be noted. 
3^ In what consciousness is always concrete. 
4*'. Why consciousness cannot be defined. 

5^ Content of consciousness considered §55, p. 57 

1^. How justify this more extended meaning. 
3^ Conditions of Consciousness. 

l^ What conditions its existence §56, p. 59 

1^. What opposition is primarily requisite. 

2*^. What other opposition excites consciousness. 

2^ What conditions its continuance §57, p. 60 

1^. Subordination of this condition to that of existence. 

§58, p. 60 
3*'. The law of Eelativity. 
1^ What this is. 
1^. What follows as to the knowledge of the absolute. 
4^. Our experience in the awakening and modification of 

any mode of consciousness §59, p. 61 

1°. What every mode of mind necessitates, 
l*^. Into what all knowledge ultimately resolves. 
4*. Limits of Consciousness. 

l^ Only of the actual, not of the potential §60, p. 62 

2^. Only of the present, not of the past nor of the future. 

§61, p. 62 
1°. Xot of the non-existent nor of the absent. 
2^. Only of that which is hie et nunc. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology, 65 

3°. Hence what is consciously known is immediately 
known. 
1*^. Memory is immediate knowledge of a present mental 
image. 
4"^. Belief concerning a past event is not consciousness, 
but conviction. 
3^ Only of the positive, not of the negative. . . .§62, p. 63 
1*^. Consciousness of absence of a thing, unconsciousness 
of its presence. 
4*^. Certain limitations which are questioned. . .§63, p. 63 
1^. Are we conscious always ? 
l*^. Lack of proof that one is ever wholly unconscious. 
1®. As to another. 
2®. As to ourselves. 
2^. What balances the supposition that consciousness 
sinks to zero? 
1®. What conclusion this furnishes as to sleep. 
2®. What definition of mind this justifies. 
2^ Are we conscious of more than one thing at a time ? 

§64, p. 64 
1^. All our generic powers are in constant exercise. 
2^ Cognitive -consciousness never exclusively occupied 

with a single object. 
3*^. The results of an examination of any state of mind. 
4^. The function of attention. 

1®. The law of limitation. 
3°. Are we conscious of all mental activities?. .§65, p. 65 
l*^. Consideration and refutation of the hypothesis of 
unconscious mental activities. 
1®. When logical law discredits a hypothesis of a cause 

which is not a vera causa. 
2®. What class of facts reflex action explains. 
3®. What may fairly be referred to unconscious cerebra- 
tion. 
4®. What may fairly be referred to obscure conscious- 
ness. 
5®. Conclusion from the concomitant variation of con- 
sciousness and activity. 
1'. How show the absurdity of the phrase "unconscious 
mental activity .'' 
5*. Facts of Consciousness. 

l**. What are facts of consciousness? ^Q6, p. 68 

V. A general fact of consciousness. 



56 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

2°. Special facts of consciousness. 

S*". In perception what is given as a fact of consciousness. 
4''. How inferences are confounded with facts of conscious- 
ness. 

2^ Characteristics of facts of consciousness §67, p. 69 

. I''. They are primary. 
2"^. They are simple. 
3^ They are ultimate. 
4*=. They are original. 
5^^. They are self-evident. 
3^ The assertiveness of facts of consciousness. . .§68, p. 69 
1^. We are constrained to accept their existence. 
2^. The constraint attends consciousness only. 

4^ Criterion of Consciousness §69, p. 70 

1°. What the consciousness of reality involves. 
1^. The marks of this certainty. 

2*. What effect doubt has upon a seeming fact of con- 
sciousness. 
3^. What limitation is needful. 
5^ What the facts of consciousness constitute.. .§70, p. 71 
1^. What makes their importance more manifest. 
2"=. What the great problem is. 
6*. Modes of Consciousness. 

P. General outline §71, p. 72 

1^. The universal and fundamental phenomenon of mind. 
1^. The generic relations of consciousness. 
1®. Modes that are consciousness and nothing more. 
1'. The objective mode — cognition. 
2^. The subjective mode — feeling. 
2®. Modes that are consciousness and something more, 
which something more is an endeavor, hence called 
Conations. 
1*. The objective mode — volition. 
2*. The subjective mode — desire. 
2°. Denominations. 
1^. The primary powers: consciousness in the narrower 
sense and conation. 
1®. The generic powers : Cognition, Feeling, Desire, and 
Will. 
1*. The specific powers. 
3®. What generic powers coexist and which are condi- 
tioned on others. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 57 

4°. General view of the generic powers and their subdi- 
visions. 

1^. Cognition or objective consciousness §72, p. 73 

1®. Definition. 

2®. How the specific powers are determined. 
3®. The kinds of cognition or knowledge. 
1'. Immediate, intuitive, or presentative knowledge. 
1^. The specific powers of intuitive cognition. 
1^. Empirical intuitions. 
1\ Perception and what it is. 
2\ Self-perception and what it is. 
2^. Pure intuition or reason and what it is. 
2*. Mediate or representative knowledge. 
1^. The object known and through what known. 
2^. The specific powers of representative cognition. 
1^. Memory. 
2^. Imagination. 
3^. Thought. 

2^. Feeling, or subjective consciousness §'^3, p. 74 

1®. Definition. 

2®. Its relation to cognition — psychologically correlative. 

3®. Relatively to each other into wliat two classes the 

feelings fall. 
4®. Relatively to the coexistent — cognitions into what 
three classes the feelings fall. 
1^ Sensation. 
2'. Emotion. 
3^ Sentiment. 

3^. Desire or svibjective conation §74, p. 74 

1®. To what correlative. 

2®. Into what two classes the Desires fall relatively to 

each other. 
3^. How divided and to what they correspond. 
1^ Physical, as the appetites, corresponding to sensa- 
tions. 
2^ Psychical, as the affections, corresponding to senti- 
ments. 

4*^. Volition or objective conation §75, p. 75 

1®. What it has for its direct, immediate object. 
2®. Its elements, what they are and in what they issue. 
1'. Choice issuing in intention. 
2^ Effort issuing in attention. 
1^. What effort determines. 



60 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

IK How these organs must be considered. 
2^ The standpoint to be maintained to enjoy the 
certainties of consciousness. 
3^. From what perception needs to be discriminated. 

§97, p. 92 

1\ From its correlative sensation. 

2^. From mediate perception of which perception 

proper is an element. 

4^. What perception proper really gives. . .§98, p. 93 

l'^. An important feature common to the several 

modes of perception §99, p. 94 

1'. How this contrasts with mediate cognition. 
2'. What perception is relative to its objects. 
3'. Absolute passivity denied. 
5^. The percept. 
1*". The relation of the percept to the mind. 

§100, p. 96 
1^ Why we cannot explain how they are. 
2\ What is admitted by all philosophers and skep- 
tics. 
S\ The common conviction of men as to the per- 
cept. 
1^. Explanations offered. 
1^. Berkeley's dogmatic Idealism. 
2^ Descartes's problematic Idealism. 
3^. Doctrine of immediate perception. 
1'. Argument for immediate perception. 

§101, p. 97 
im Argument from action and passion. 
2™. Argument from cause and effect. 
3°". Independence and frequent conflict of 
mental and physical energy. 
l'^. The distinct realities external to each 
other marked by this opposition and 
subjection. 
4™. The conclusion. 
2^ Does consciousness deceive us in this matter ? 

§102, p. 99 
1™. What is asserted by some as to this. 

1". A distinction these make. 
2™. The answer to this assertion. 
1". The result if this assertion be true. 
2°. The ineptitude of this distinction. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 61 

2^. The immediate perception of extra-organic body. 

§103, p. 100 
1*. What is taken now as granted. 
2\ What is the true non-ego of consciousness. 
3^ The non-existence of most of the percepts in ex- 
ternal bodies. 
4\ The qualities of body. 
1^ The secondary qualities of body. 

I''. Why so reckoned. 
2K The primary essential and defining qualities 
of body. 
1^. What these are. 
1'. Where they are supposed to exist. 
2^ What follows if these are not immediately 
perceived. 
2^. To what senses perception of extension is at- 
tributed §104, p. 100 

1'. A case examined. 
3^. To what sense perception of impenetrability 

is attributed. 
4^. What body is thus made known to me. 

§105, p. 101 
1'. How then do we get a consciousness of an 
outer world of things ? 
1™. Voluntary locomotion, its nature and re- 
sults. 
1". On what the primary knowledge of extra- 
organic body depends. 
2". The triple combination by which we dis- 
tinguish between our own frame and 

foreign bodies .§106, p. 103 

1°. What is fitted for the exercise of this 
combination. 
5\ The conclusion as to immediate perception of 
extra-organic body. 
6^. What the order of the discussion of the senses and 

their percept is §107, p. 103 

1^. What seems to be an important condition of the 
development of the cognitive intelligence and 
the result of this condition. 
2'. Self-Perception. 

1^. Definition §108, p. 105 

2^. From what it should be distinguished. 



63 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

1^. Consciousness in general. 

2\ Self -consciousness §109, p. 105 

IK The distinction illustrated as to 
1^. Perception. 
2K Self-consciousness. 
3^ Self-perception. 
1^. A mental state objectified. 
2^. A mental state viewed as a thing distinct 

from me. 
3^. A mental state known to be a mode of self. 

3e. Its object §110, p. 106 

. I*'. As compared with perception. 
2^. With what identical, how distinguished. 

§111, p. 106 
4^. What authorizes a distinction in self-perception. 
1^. The number of its varieties. 
1'. Introspection. 
v. Exemplified. 

2\ Reflection §112, p. 107 

1^ How distinguished from introspection. 
1^ By the specific character of its object. 
1^ What this object is. 
1™. The representative character of this object. 
1°. Why it is necessarily representative. 
2^ Pure Presentation. (See §110, p. 106.) 
1'. Pure Intuition. 

le. Primary truths §113, p. 108 

1^. Why needed. 
2^. How obtained. 
3*^. What they are. 
1^ Facts of consciousness. 
1^ Presentative. 
2K Immediate. 
3^ Intuitive. 
4^. Illustrations giving their rationale and relation 
to sense. 
2K Definition of Pure Intuition. 

3^ Some examples considered §114, p. 109 

1^. Existence. 
2^. Time. 
3^. Space. 
4^. Causation. 
4^ General remarks on these examples. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology, 63 

1^. Eelation to sensuous experience. 
1^. Negatively. 

1*. Not empirical, not given by sensuous experience. 
2^ Positively. 
1^ They always attend or are evoked by sensuous 
experience. 
5'. The characteristics of Pure Intuition. .§115, p. 110 
1^. Abstract. 
1^. What elements are always conjoined. 
2^. How these elements are separated. 
3^. Not qualities, yet actual only in the concrete. 
4^. Abstraction not necessary to complete cognition, 

2^. Catholic §116, p. Ill 

I''. Catholicity limitless. 

3^. Self-evident, positive view §117, p. Ill 

1^. How pure ideas are denominated when expressed 
in propositions. 

4^. Certain, negative view §118, p. 112 

1^. Aristotle quoted. 

5s. Necessary §119, p. 113 

1^. From what this specifically differentiates pure 

ideas and why. 
2\ Examples given. 
1*. Self-existence. 
2K Body is heavy and occupies space. 

6^. Strict universality §120, p. 114 

1\ Kant quoted. 

2*^. Strict universality and necessity the same thing 
in different aspects. 

3^ The kinds of general truth §121, p. 115 

1'. Logical generality, what it is and how attained. 
2*. General truth by the hazard of induction. 
3^ The generality belonging to pure truth. 
4*". Distinction between strict universality and catho- 

olicity §122, p. 116 

1'. A common judgment not necessarily a pure 
truth. 
6'. The classification of Pure Intuitions. .§123, p. 117 
7'. The Origin of Pure Truth. 

IS. The questions stated §124, p. 118 

1^. Is the knowledge of pure truth innate or adven- 
titious ? 
2^. Is the object ideal or real ? 



64 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

3^. If real, is that reality itself intuitively known, 
or is it known only through a representative 
idea? 
2^. The rival schools as to the first question. 

V. Modern Empirical Philosophy §125, p. 118 

1\ Its founder and what he maintained. 
2\ Its strongest advocate and his views. 

IK In what he finds necessity to consist. 
S\ What empirical philosophy denies. 
1^ All a priori cognition of truth. 
2K That the intellect is itself a source of knowl- 
edge. 
3^ That there is any essential distinction between 
contingent and necessary truth. 
4\ What empirical philosophy holds. 
1^ That sensuous experience is the origin and 

sole basis of all knowledge. 
2^. That necessity arises only because of an ex- 
perience that is invariable and hence in- 
vincible in thought. 
5^ The logical and historical result of empirical 

philosophy. 
6\ A reply to empirical philosophy. . .§126, p. 120 
1^ A general reply. 
1^ Experience cannot establish necessitj^ 
2^^. Experience is not requisite to necessity. 
2K Specific replies. 
1^. What proposition the empiricist says is an 
induction from experience. 
1'. The reasons this cannot be true. 
1™. A syllogism in Cesar e concluding, "This 

judgment is not empirical." 
2™. A second syllogism in Cesare concluding, 

"This judgment is not empirical." 

3". A syllogism in Cam est res concluding, 

"This judgment is not inductive." 

2^ Modern Intuitional Philosophy §127, p. 122 

l^ Its founder and what he maintained. 
2\ Who expounded and defended it more fully and 
his views. 

S\ Kant's "forms of cognitions" §128, p. 123 

1^ What they are. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 65 

1^. That which the mind imposes on the matter 

of its knowledge. 
2^ They are wholly subjective, having no cor- 
responding objective reality. 
2K How they are given. 

3^. How many pure forms of sensuous intuition 
there are. 
1^ Space and what it is. 
2^. Time and what it is. 
4:K Hansel's summary of Kant's view. 
1^ The subject remains one and unchanged in 

successive acts. 
2\ To what the changeable features distinguish- 
ing one mode of consciousness from an- 
other are probably due. 
5^ The logical and historical result of Kantian- 
ism. 
1:^ A restatement of intuitionism which is now 

widely prevalent §129? P- 1^5 

1^ Empirical intuitions. 
1^. Adventitious to the mind and strictly sen- 
suous. 
2^. Being a posteriori^ it is acquired and con- 
tingent. 
3^ Its matter is given to consciousness. 
2K Pure intuitions. 
1^. Native to the mind and strictly intellectual. 

1^ What is meant by native to the mind. 
2^. Being a priori, it is original and necessary. 
3^. Its form is given hy consciousness. 
1^ What results from this subjective origin. 
1™. They are thus the conditions of knowledge. 
2™. Their criterion, necessity, is also viewed as 
wholly subjective in its origin. 
1°. The negative definition of necessity. 
2°. The positive definition of necessity. 
3°. The result. 
5^ Mr. Davis's view of intuitional philosophy. 

§130, p. 126 
1^ The cognitive powers with which mind is con- 
stituted. 
1^. Positively stated. 
1^ To know self. 



66 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

2^. To know things other than self^ the condi- 
tions of their being, and their relations. 
2\ Negatively stated. 
1^ Xot with things or ideas of things implanted 
to be known and with a predisposition to 
know them. 
3^ The specific powers. 
1^ The powers of sense. 

1°^. The reality of their objects. 
2^ The power of pure reason. 
1™. The reality of its objects. 
2^ Examples. 
1\ Time. 
2^. Cause. 
3^ The objective reality of pure truths .... p. 149 
1^. Xot dependent on mind to originate or ap- 
prehend them. 
2^. 'Not dependent on things, like qualities, but 

things are dependent on them. 
3^. They stand prior to things in the relation of 
condition to conditioned. 

4:1 How discerned §131, p. 128 

6^ The nature of pure ideas. 
1^. Abstract. 
2^. Eepresentative. 
1^ How entertained. 

6^ The criterion of pure truth §132, p. 129 

1^. What is given as this efficient and sufficient 
criterion. 
1^ What this is not. 

1™. ISTot at all the ground of pure truth. 
2^ The relation of the nature of the idea and 

subjective necessity. 
3^ The relation of the truth of pure principles 
and our belief of them. 
2^^. What is given along with necessity. 
1^ When this appears. 

2'. The relation of generalization and uni- 
versality. 
7^. Why this view does not carrv us into empirical 

philosophy ^ §133, p. 130 

1^. We do not give up pure intuition. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 67 

1^ The knowledge of pure truth is adventitious, 

but not sensuous. 
2^ The relation of empirical and pure intuition 
as to activity and passivity. 
8^ Psychology and philosophy, their domain and 

their questions. 
9^ A summary view of the questions as to pure 
truth and the answers of Mr. Davis. 
1^. Is the knowledge of pure truth innate or 
adventitious ? 
1'. Pure truth originates without; it is adven- 
titious. (See §130, p. 127.) 
2^. Is the object real or ideal ? 
l^ The object is real. It must be in order that 
things may be. (See §130, p. 127.) 
3^. Is that reality itself intuitively known or 
known only through a representative idea ? 
1^ Pure truth is primarily and immediately 
discerned in a presentation, a fact of con- 
sciousness. (See §131, p. 128.) 

IC*. Mind and Matter §135, pp. 132, 133 

1®. How mind has been thus far looked upon. 

2®. Different opinions as to nature of the substratum. 

3^. The two parts found in every existing thing and how 

they are known §135, pp. 132, 133 

4®. Are thought and matter ultimately identical ? 
1'. Monism. 

IS. Idealism §136, p. 133 

1^. What it is. 
2^. Its forms. 
1^ The problematical Idealism of Descartes. 
1^ What it is. The existence of body is doubtful 
and undemonstrable. 
2*. The dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley. 
1^ What it is. The existence of body is false and 

impossible. 
2^ What it maintains. 
3^ The critical Idealism of Kant. 
1^. What it admits. 
2^ What it denies. 
3^ Into what it logically resolves. 
1^ The absolute Idealism of Jacobi, Fichte, 
Schelling, and Hegel. 



68 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

4\ The Idealism of Schopenhauer. 
3^. The self-contradiction chargeable upon the advo- 
cates of Idealism §137, p. 135 

2s. Materialism §138, p. 136 

I*'. What it teaches. 

2\ Its most refined and subtile form. .§139, p. 137 

3^. What is admitted by Mr. Davis in reference to 

the statement of Materialism by its advocates. 

§140, p. 138 
1*. Not to be rejected because of the seeming in- 
compatibility of two series of phenomena in- 
hering in one substance. 
2\ What Occam's law — the law of parcimony — 

compels us to admit. 
3\ Analogy from nature in favor of Materialism. 
4**. Some objections of greater weight to Material- 
ism §141, p. 139 

v. Its unwarranted assumption. 
1^. What the hypothesis assumes. 
2K What the h3T3othesis ignores. 
2K He gives the preponderance and priority to the 
physical series when it should be given to the 
mental. 
1^ Because facts of consciousness are known to 
us immediately and in themselves, while 
facts of the external world are known to us 
not in themselves, but mediately through 
the facts of consciousness. 
3*. The materialist is guilty of another unphilo- 
sophic assumption. 
1^ How the materialist begs the question. 
2K The phenomena of the thought series give as 
much evidence of the existence and play of 
force as the phenomena of the thing series. 
3^. It is a fact of consciousness that certain of the 
thought series are the conditional ante- 
cedents or causes of the thing series, and 
vice versa. 
4*. The logical consequences of Materialism. 
1^ Extreme agnosticism. 

2K Involves necessitated will and reduces man to 
an irresponsible automaton. 
3^. Absolute identity §142, p. 141 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 69 

1^. What testimony of consciousness some monists 

admit. 
2^. What testimony of consciousness they deny. 
3^. What they maintain as to matter and mind. 
4^. Upon what its advocates rely for proof. 

§143, p. 142 
1\ What the refined monist infers from this con- 
comitant variation. 
2^ The logical fallacy of this course shown. 
5^. Historically the doctrine is of unstable equi- 
librium §144, p. 143 

2'. Dualism §145, p. 144 

1^. What it teaches. 

2^. The grounds on which Dualism opposes Monism. 
1^. No hypothesis of unity can explain the facts. 
2^. Every form of Monism leads logically and his- 
torically to revolting consequences. 
3^. Its accord with the law of parcimony. 

3'. Evidence in favor of Dualism §146, p. 145 

1^. An answer to the earlier forms of Idealism. 
1^. That "I am" is but a part of the primum cog- 
nitum, the complete fact of consciousness is 
"Both I and another exist." 
2^. Answer to the later forms of Idealism. 
1^. What must be maintained. 
1'. That we immediately perceive body in its essen- 
tial and objectively existing characters. 
2\ That body possessed these characters in the 

same manner as they are perceived by us. 
3\ That thus and so far noumena became phe- 
nomena. 
4'. A positive argument in favor of Dualism against 

Materialism §147, p. 146 

1^. The major premise and how proven. 
1*^. This is reached from a subjective or psycho- 
logical standpoint. 
2^. The minor premise and how proven. 
1^. This is reached from an objective or physiolog- 
ical standpoint. 
3^. The conclusion. 
1^. What this shows as to Materialism as a whole. 
5'. The distinction and the connection of mind and 
brain §148, p. 148 



70 Analysis of Elements of Psychology, 

6'. The seat of the soul §149, p. 148 

2^. Representation. 

1^. Definition §150, p. 150 

2^. How distinguished from (1^=) Presentation. 
1®. The number of objects and how known. 
1^ In presentation there is one object, and this is in- 
tuitively known. 
2^ In representation two, the proximate representing 
medium intuitively known, the object-object 
mediately known. 
2®. The manner of this knowledge and the existence of 
the object. 
1^ In presentation a thing is known in itself. 

1^. What this knowledge involves. 
2^ In representation a thing is known in or through 
something not itself. 
1^. What this knowledge involves. 
3®. The presence of the object. 
1^ In presentation the object is present to me liic et 
nunc. 
1^. This is knowledge of what is present in time. 
2*. In representation the object-object is remote. 
1^. This is knowledge of what is past. 
4®. The character of the knowledge. 
1^ In presentation the knowledge is original and cer- 
tain. 
2^. In representation the knowledge is derived and un- 
certain. 
5®. The nature of the object. 
l^ In presentation the object is always an. individual. 
2^ In representation the object-object may be an in- 
dividual or a plurality of individuals united in 
a class and known by means of a concept or gen- 
eral notion. 
3^. The modes of representative cognition generally 

stated §151, p. 151 

1®. Memory. 

1^ What the medium represents. 
2^. Imagination. 

1'. What the medium represents. 
3«. Thought. 
l^ What the medium represents. 
4^. The relation of representation to presentation. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 71 

1®. The former is conditioned on the latter. 

2®. Each of the specific modes conditions that following 

it in the order named. 
3®. On what all are conditioned. 
5*^. Intellect and sense. 

6\ The medium §152, p. 152 

1®. What this characteristic feature may be. 
1*. An object perceived. 
1^. Its two modes. 
1^ An imitation. 
2*^. A symbol. 

2^ A mental image, an idea .§153, p. 154 

1^. Whence the mind has power to form images. 
2^. The existence of the mental image. 
I*'. How a cognition. 
2^. How a representation. 

3^. The characteristics of the image §154, p. 155 

1^. They are mental modes merely. 
2^^. Mental images are always sensuous. §155, p. 155 
1^ A thing is always represented as the object of 
the sense originally perceiving it. 
3^ Images are always representative. .§156, p. 156 
1*. Its two modes. 
1^ An imitation. 
2^ A symbol. 
7^. Mediate Perception. 
P. How distinguished from Perception. . .§157, p. 158 
1'. Perception is immediate and simple. 
2'. Mediate perception is inferred and complex. 
2^. Why called mediate perception. 
3®. An example of mediate perception. . . .§158, p. 159 

4^ The genesis of mediate perception §159, p. 159 

1^ Simultaneous impressions of a single object and 

inferences therefrom. 
2^ A similar set of experiences and the inductive in- 
ference. 
3^ The presence of one of a set of qualities which 
have accompanied each other and the inference 
therefrom. 
4'. The presentation of one of the distinctive percepts 

and the immediate suggestion. 
5'. What the mediate perceptions are.. 



72 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

5®. Deceptions to which we are subject not of the senses, 

but of the judgment §160, p. 160 

6®. Criterion to distinguish presentative from repre- 
sentative elements §161, p. 161 

7®. Discussion of certain cognitions relative to space 
and extension in space and given only in connec- 
tion with voluntary locomotion §162, p. 162 

1*. Whence our knowledge of the existence of extra 

organic or outer things as existing in space. 

1^. Why these cognitions are examined as mediate 

perceptions of sight. 
2^. Analysis of this knowledge as to 

l^ ISTumber §163, p. 163 

1\ How the unity and plurality of objects in space 
is known. 

2^. Shape and geometrical solidity §164, p. 164 

1'. How the real figure is known. 
2\ The signs by which we judge. 
1^ Shading. 

2K Stereoscopic judgment. 
3i. Contact. 
4^ Opacity. 
3^ The test applied when error is suspected. 

3^ Direction §165, p. 167 

1'. Upon what experience the judgment of direc- 
tion rests. 
1^. As to the eye. 
1^. The tension of the muscles of the eye and 

our judgment therefrom. 
2^. The inversion of the retinal picture. 

2K As to the ear §166, p. 168 

l'^. Accuracy of the judgment by the ear as com- 
pared with that by the eye. 
4^. Size of objects and their distance from each 

other and from me §167, p. 169 

1'. What size or comparative magnitude is. 
1^. How given. 
1^. For small bodies. 
2^. For larger. 
3''. For the largest. 
2K What distance is. 

1^ How given. 
3*. What senses acquire power to discern distance. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 73 

1^ The eye's estimate of size and distance of near 
objects less than twenty feet away. 

§168, p. 170 
1^. What gives the apparent size of an object. 
2^. How judge the distance of an object from 

me. 
3^. How judge the distance between two objects. 
2K The eye's estimate of size and distance of ob- 
jects more than twenty feet away. 

§169, p. 172 
l'^. Upon what it mainly depends. 
1'. Ground perspective. 
2K Aerial perspective. 

5^ Location §170, p. 173 

1'. How we locate tactile sense percepts. 
1^. Proof that the definite location of the sense 

percept is mediate. 
2^. Extension beyond the periphery of tactile and 

muscular sense perception §171, p. 175 

2\ The location of the sense percepts. 

8^ The sequence of mental states §172, p. 177 

1®. The order of sequence of external objects. 
2®. The order of sequence of subjective representations. 
1^ Logical sequence when it occurs. 
2^. Suggested sequence when it occurs. 
1^. The Laws of Suggestion. 
1^. The Law of Similarity or of Eepetition. 

§173, p. 178 
1^ The law stated. 
2\ What the law expresses. 
3^ How the contraries are reviewed. 
2*^. The Law of Association or of Eedintegration. 

§174, p. 179 
v. The law stated. 
2'. When the experience causing the adhesion is 

one of succession §1*^5, p. 180 

1^ The disappearance of intermediate links. 
3'. When the total is a complement of states asso- 
ciated by simultaneity §1'^6> P- 181 

4*. Indissoluble association §1'^'^, p. 182 

5^ To what modes of cognition the Laws of Sim- 
ilarity and of Association are applicable. 

§178, p. 183 



'74: Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

V. Cognitions do not set the limit. 

3^. The Law of Preference §179, p. 184 

1\ The law stated. 

2\ The complementary character of this law. 

3'. What effect individual dispositions, tastes, and 

habits have upon associations. 
4:\ The secondary laws of association. 
5\ The principle of Association and the English 

school of psychologists §180, p. 186 

9^. The specific faculties of Representation. 

P. Memory §181, p. 187 

1'. Definition. 

1^. What this definition implies. 
2'. What seems to be an ultimate constitutional fact. 
3'. Judgments contained in an act of memory. 

§182, p. 187 
1^. The primary and psychological judgment. 
1*^. What it affirms. 
2^. Its intuitive character. 
1*. Evidence that this is a psychological judgment. 
2^. The secondary judgment of memory. §183, p. 188 
1^. What it affirms. 
2^. "WTience our distrust of memory. 
3^. To what the degree of belief attending it seems 
to correspond. 
1\ How our confidence in recollecting a past fact 
is increased. 
4'. According to what laws memory acts. .§184, p. 189 
1^. What these laws are so far as they apply to cog- 
nition. 
5^ In what more general law that of memory is in- 
volved §185, p. 189 

1^. In what this theory of repetition is in contrast. 
1^. The theories of retention. 
IK The persistence of mental activity. 
1^ The objections to this theory. 
1^. It involves unconscious mental states. 
2^. A perception and the recollection differ 
widely in kind. 
2'. Memory due to physical action. . .§186, p. 190 
1^. What is admitted as to this hypothesis. 
2K What is denied as to this hypothesis. 
1^. What facts it does not explain. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 75 

6'. Kinds of memory §187, p. 193 

1^. Eemembrance, or involuntary memory. 
I'*. How exercised. 

2\ According to what laws one image follows an- 
other in this. 
3^. How subdivided. 
1\ Simple recognition. 

1^ What law is effective here. 
2\ Complex recognition, or remembrance proper. 
1^ What law is effective here. 
2^. Recollection, or intentional memory. .§188, p. 194 
1\ What it is. 

2^. How show that what we seek for in memory is 
not wholly unknown. 
3^. A distinction of practical importance.§189, p. 196 
1*^. Circumstantial memory. 

1^ On what dependent. 
2^. Philosophic memory. 
1^ By what determined. 
!®. Imagination. 

1'. Definition §190, p. 198 

1^. The specific difference in the definition explained. 
1^. The kinds of objects of knowledge. 
1^ The real object. 
2^ The unreal object. 
S\ The ideal object. 
2'. The objects of imagination. 
1^. How distinguished from those of memory. 

§191, p. 198 
3'. Limits to the mind's excursive power in imagina- 
tion §192, p. 199 

1^. Imagination is conditioned on memory. 
1^. What it cannot transgress. 
2^^. What furnishes materials for imagination. 
3^. What is the true limitation. 
2^. Its immediate object must be individual. 

1^. Of what we can form no image. 
3^. The limitation common, to all powers of knowl- 
edge : Conditioned on Pure Ideas. 

4'. The kinds of imagination §193, p. 201 

1^. The true kinds. 
1^. Simple imagination. 



76 Analysis of Elements of Psychology, 

1\ The transfer of an object from the real to the 

ideal sphere. 
2\ To idealize in spite of fact. 
2^. Complex or productive imagination. §194, p. 202 
1\ Distinction between qualitative and quantita- 
tive wholes. 
2\ Kinds of complex or productive imagination. 
1^ Constructive imagination. 
2^ Plastic imagination. 
2^. Varieties determined according to the relative 
predominance of cooperating activities. 

§195, p. 203 
1^. Involuntary imagination. 
1*. An appropriate name for this variety. 
2\ What is their origin. 
3\ By what characterized. 
4\ Examples of phantasy. 

5\ Relation of imagination to brain action noted. 

§196, p. 204 
V. On what all mental activities are specifically 
conditioned. 
1^. Cases in which the cause is mental and the 

effect a brain change. 
2^. Cases in which the cause is a brain change 
and the effect is mental. 
1^ How show involuntary memory and imagi- 
nation differ from perception in degree 
rather than in kind. 
2^ What mental functions demand a lower de- 
gree of brain excitement than others. 

2^. Voluntary imagination §197, p. 207 

1*. How distinguished from phantasy. 
2'. Differences conditioned on desire. 
1^. Artistic imagination exercised with special 
reference to sentiment and conditioned on 

a desire to feel §198, p. 207 

1^. What it specifically characterizes. 
2*^. Subvarieties of artistic imagination. 
1'. Fancy. 

2'. Poetic imagination §199, p. 209 

1™. How "poetic" is here understood. 
2K Reflective imagination exercised with refer- 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 77 

ence to knowledge and conditioned on a de- 
sire to know §200, p. 209 

1^. Why so called. 

2^. Subvarieties of reflective imagination. 
1'. Philosophic or scientific imagination. 

I'". With what it is largely occupied. 
2K That corresponding closely with what Aris- 
totle calls "the deliberative imagination." 

§201, p. 211 

3^. Practical imagination exercised with reference 

to performance and conditioned on a desire 

to do §202, p. 211 

1^. To what it is confined. 
2^. The bounds of imagination. 
3\ Subvarieties of practical imagination. 
l^ Ideas of action. 
1"". To what it bears a special relation. 
2°^. Defined. 

3™. What every outward activity requires. 
4°". The limit set to this variety of imagina- 
tion. 

2\ Ideal standards of action §203, p. 213 

1". The specific sense of the noun "ideal." 
2°". An ideal what, in a psychological sense. 
3™. The beau ideal what, in a critical sense. 
4™. Ideals of character and conduct. 
5°^. The ideal and idols. 

3«. Thought §204, p. 216 

1^ Definition. 

1^. How the word "notion" is used. 
2^ What is a primary condition of thought. 

§205, p. 217 
3^ Three elements or operations or movements log- 
ically distinguished. 
1^. Abstraction. 
1^. Definition. 

2^. The psychological correlative of Abstraction. 
3^. How mental dissection differs from abstraction. 
4\ The process of abstraction is what?. §206, p. 218 
l^ Qualities in the concrete and in the abstract. 

2^. Generalization §207, p. 219 

1\ Definition. 
3^. Conception §208, p. 219 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

1^. A concept defined. 
2^. Esser's definition — a complex concept. 
3^. What is the ultimate product of thought. 
4^ What is a process subsidiary to thought. 

§209, p. 221 
1^. Why needed. 
2^. Intension and extension of the concept and the 

law §210, p. 222 

5'. Generalization and Determination what. 

§211, p. 223 
1^. With what thought is constantly and exclusively 
occupied. 
6'. The process and product of thought examined 
under a different aspect and with a varied ter- 
minology §212, p. 224 

1^. What every movement of cognitive consciousness 
is. 
1^. The kinds of judgment. 
1\ Intuitions. 
2\ Inferences. 
1^ The two directions of inferences. 
I''. Induction. 
1^ Definition. 
2^. Deduction. 
1^ Immediate inferences. 
2^ Mediate inferences or reasonings. 
2^. The relation of judgment and conception. 

§213, p. 225 
T. The relation of thought to other powers. 

§214, p. 226 
1^. When the thinking is conditioned on memory. 
2^. The relation of thought to imagination. 
1^. What imagination presents to thought. 
v. How thought can elaborate and comprehend 
the concept. 
2^. How imagination enables thought to realize its 

products §215, p. 227 

1'. The intuition of a case. 
1^ What this is called. 
2K Intuitive thinking defined. 

2'. The intuition of a s}Tnbol §216, p. 229 

1^ What this is called. 

2K What is used as expressive of the concept. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 79 

3^ Symbolic thinking defined. 

4^ How test symbolic thinking §217, p. 230 

1^. Of what kind of imagination this process is 
a function. 

8^ Truth §218, p. 231 

IS. Definition. 

2^. What the question, "What is truth ?" seeks. 
1^. What must furnish the criterion of truth, and 
why. 
1\ What are negative criteria of truth. 
2^ Why there can be no positive criterion of truth. 
1^ How then do we know that we know ? 

3e. Error the opposite of truth §219, p. 234 

1^. Definition. 

2*^. In what faculties error has no place. 
3^. Only thought errs. 
1\ Why should thought err ? 
1^ Some checks to error. 
2K Some reasons for error. 
SK Feelings and desires not primary causes of 

error. 
4^. Imagination the chief est, perhaps the sole, 

cause of error §220, p. 236 

1^. Imagination displacing thought. 
2^. Illusions and delusions. 
3^^. Imagination mistaken for memory. 
4^^. The imposition of deliberative imagination. 
5^. Precipitate inductions. 
6^. N'atural love of truth, but not of labor. 
2\ Feeling. (For 1^ see p. 58 of this analysis.) 
1^. Its characteristics. 
1^. Relation to consciousness and in logical opposition to 

what §221, p. 239 

2"". How distinguished from the generic powers. 
1^. From Cognition. 
1®. Feeling and Cognition are psychological correla- 
tives. 
2®. What is meant by a cognition being objective and a 

feeling subjective. 
3®. Neither is in any sense antecedent to the other. 
4®. They are not directly proportional. They exist 
only as they coexist, and are in inverse ratio. 

§222, p. 241 



80 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

5®. Change necessary to continuity of feeling. 

§223, p. 241 
1^. Degree of feeling proportional to change. 
2^. The subordinate law of accommodation. 
3^ Primary movement of consciousness lies in feeling 
rather than in cognition. 

6«. Novelty not a feeling, but what §224, p. 243 

1^ To what novelty is opposed. 
1^. Familiarity the feeling correlative to memory. 
1^. To what the strength of this feeling of famil- 
iarity is proportioned. 
1^ By what it is largely determined. 

2\ From Desire §225, p. 244 

1®. The want and impulse found in Desire are absent 

from Feeling. 
2®. Their difference as to time. 
3^ The marks or qualities characteristic of Feeling in 
general — i. e., belonging to all classes of Feelings, 

and to Feelings only §226, ^p. 245 

1^. Consciousness of self. 
1®. Given a cognition, then in the correlative feeling is 
given self. Thus the consciousness that I am 
lies in the fact that I feel. 
2®. Different value in distinguishing self from the rest 
of the world and the distinction of another thing 
from a third. 
3®. Concomitant variation of consciousness of self and 

of feeling. 
4®. Distinction between the primary consciousness of 
feeling and the after cognition of it. 
2*^. Strict certainty is the feeling of necessity. It admits 

of no measure of doubt §2^'^? P- 247 

1®. Belief, the correlative of mediate cognition, approxi- 
mates certainty, but never reaches it. 
2®. The logical or formal opposite of belief is disbelief, 
but as a mental fact these are one, disbelief being 
belief of a contrary. The psychological and real 
opposite of belief is doubt, which two always co- 
exist, but in inverse ratio. Ignorance is the op- 
posite of certainty. 
3®. Mediate judgment and belief what. On what the 
strength of belief does not and on what it does 
depend. An error what. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 81 

3"*. Every feeling is marked by pleasure or pain. 

§228, p. 249 
1®. Cannot make a primary division of feeling into 
pleasant and painful. These are of degree rather 
than of kind. One often graduates into the other 
by a change in intensity only. 
2®. Both pleasure and pain are positive, but either may 
be viewed as negative with reference to the other. 
No absolute pleasure or pain. How they coexist 
and their tendency to neutralize each other. 
3®. Aristotle's explanation of these phonemena what. 
4®. Pleasure and pain are not the fundamental and sole 
determinant of character and conduct. 
1'. The extent to which the doctrine has been carried. 
4"^. A negative characteristic of feelings in general is 
that they are spontaneous or at least involuntary. 

§229, p. 252 
1®. Our inability to originate or control or suppress di- 
rectly any feeling. Sole function of will noted 
and how it influences other powers. 
1^ When we call them spontaneous. 
2®. What self-mastery implies. Its opposite what. 
1'. How will successfully resists this subjection. 
1^. By withdrawing from the exciting object. 
2^. Giving attention, when the exciting object con- 
tinues to be present, to thoughts of duty or 
fit conduct or consequences. 
3^. When attention is firmly fixed on an object, the 
causes of feeling other than those that attend 
it are inoperative. 
1^. Examples given. 
5*^. Feeling tends to produce certain specific physical ef- 
fects, both in the organs of movement and in, the 

viscera — e. g., smiles and tears §230, p. 253 

1®. The definite wave of effects attending pleasure and 
pain, where it spreads, what it affects, and how 
manifested. 
1*. How distinguish this diffusion from reflex action. 
1^. By the consciousness attending the feeling, but 

not always the reflex action. 
2^. By the general wave of effects diffused by the feel- 
ing and the single effect to which reflex action 
is limited. 
6 



82 Analysis of Elements of Psychology, 

3^. The chief distinction is that mind is the cause of 
the physical action in feeling, whereas in reflex 
action mind is only affected if at all concerned. 
2^ The kinds of instinct. 
1^. Eeflex action purely physical instinct. 
2^. Diffusion of feeling, partly mental and partly 
physical, may be termed psycho-physical in- 
stincts. 
3^. Instincts treated under desire, purely mental. 
These are termed psychical instincts. 
3^ The nature of instincts. 
1^. Purely involuntary in their primary action. 

p. 254 
1^. What power we have to control them. 
1\ How far this is true of the psycho-physical in- 
stincts. 
2®. Physical effects of feeling persist, but not the feel- 
ing itself, when the correlative cognition ceases. 
3®. Effects of feeling in physiognomic expression largely 
through what nerve. 
1^ Examples given. 
2^ What the most expressive feature and why. 

1^. Examples of expression. 
3^. N^ext to facial, what nerves are most susceptible. 
1^. Examples of expression. 
4®. The organic effects of feeling and where produced. 
1^. Examples given. 
2^. Logical distribution of feeling as determined by specific 

characteristics §231, p. 256 

1^. What are excluded. 
1^. In what character and disposition lie and in what 

talent and abilities. 
2^. Why feelings and desires have a number of names in 
common. 
2^. Why the divisions and subdivisions of cognition can- 
not be transferred to feeling and the correlatives 
marked. 
3^. The scheme adopted for purposes of orderly discussion. 
I. Consciousness. 
l^ Objective consciousness or Cognition. (See p. 58 of this 

analysis.) 
2*. Subjective consciousness or Feeling, coordinate with 1^. 
1^. Its characteristics. (See p. 79 of this analysis.) 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 83 

2^ Its distribution. 
1*=. Sensation, answering to Perception. 
1**. Subdivision of Sensation. 
1®. Sensus vagus. 
2®. Sensus fixus. 
2^. Emotion — 2^ and 3° correlative to Intellect. 
3*^. Sentiment. 
1^. General marks. 
2*^. Subdivision of Sentiment. 
1®. Sensuous. 
2«. Pure. 
1*. Intellectual. 
2^ Ethical. 
1^. Sensation (see Just above). 
1^. Points to be noted. 
1®. To what sensations bear a specific relation. 

§232, p. 258 
2®. Of what they and their attendant perceptions are 

the effects. 
3®. How sensations and sentiments are sometimes de- 
scribed. 
4®. What basis sensations have. 
5^ What is sufficient to say. 
2^. From what sensation should be distinguished. 
1^ Perception. 
2®. Diffusion of feeling. 
1*. In sensation the feeling is an effect; in diffusion 
it is a cause. 
3"^. Subdivision of sensation. 
1^ Sensus vagus. 

1^. Its subjective character §233, p. 258 

2^ The evidence of percipient power. 
3'. Groups of these feelings. 
1^. The nerves and nerve centers determine a class 
of sensations according to the organic condi- 
tion of their -own tissue. 
1^. What should be classed as true pain. 
2*". The distinct sensibility of nervous exhaustion 

and its opposite. 
3^. What sensations the term ^^nervousness" in- 
cludes and from what it arises. This is mas- 
sive. 
1*. How expressed. 



84 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

4:\ The opposite of nervousness. 
2^. Sensations attending respiration include what. 

1^. How expressed. 
3^. Digestion. 
l^ What it affords. 

2^. The nature of the sensations arising from di- 
gestion. 

2^ Sensus fixus §234, p. 260 

1^. Sensations attending exercise of muscular sense. 
1^. To what they are similar. 
2^. The nature of the sensations. 
3^. Some of these sensations examined. 
l^ Fatigue. 
2^. Slumber. 
2'. Sensations attending exercise of sense of touch. 

§235, p. 261 
1^. To what they are similar. (See §234, p. 260.) 
2^. The nature of the sensation. 
3^. Some of these sensations examined. 
l^ Tickling. 
2^. Clamminess. 
3^. Subjective sensations. 
3*. Sensations attending the exercise of the sense of 

smell §236, p. 261 

1^. Classification of colors. 
1*^. Fragrant odors. 
1^ To what they appeal and what they represent. 

1^ Examples. 
2\ What we call them and their opposites. 
2^. Fresh odors. 
1\ To what they owe their character. 
1^. Examples of these and their opposites. 
3^. Appetizing odors. 
1*. What they affect and how, 
1^. Examples of these and their opposites. 
4*^. Pungent odors. 
1^ What they excite. , 

1^ Examples. 
4'. Sensations attending the exercise of the sense of 

taste §237, p. 162 

1^. Why tastes are more distinctly remembered than 
smell. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 85 

2^. From what sensations of taste should be distin- 
guished. 
1^. From those of the alimentary canal. 
3^. Classification of tastes. 
1^. The swecit taste. 
V. Its type and to what due. 
2\ Its opposite. 
2^. The acid taste. 
1^. Its nature. 
2\ Its opposite. 
3^. The saline taste. 

1\ To what principally due. 
4^. The fiery taste. 
1\ What this seems to be. 
5^ Sensations attending the exercise of the sense of 

hearing §238, p. 264 

1^. Some points common to hearing and sight. 
1^. Sensations attending them comparatively slight. 
1'. To what pleasures or pains we refer. 
2^ What a disorder or excessive action may pro- 
duce. 
3*. What effect their highest pleasures have. 
4\ The comparative duration of these pleasures. 
2^. Sensations of hearing as compared with those 

of sight. 
3^. Sounds differing in degree. 
1^. How distinguished. 
1\ Those having volume or quantity. 
2*. Loud or intense sounds. 
S\ A difference of pitch. 
4^. Sounds differing in kind. 
1^. Articulate. 
2^. Musical. 
3^. Noisy. 
6'. Sensations attending the exercise of the sense of 

sight §239, p. 265 

1^. Light. 
1^. The nature of the sensation of white light. 
2^. The effect of the sensation of white light. 
3^. With what it ranks in cheering influence. 
4^. Why its influence is powerful. 
5^. What its enjoyment requires. 
2^. Color. 



86 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

1^. By v/hat sensations attended. 
1\ Effect of each color. 
3^. Luster. 
1^. Compared to color. 
2^. Nature of lustrous bodies. 
2^ Emotion. 

1*^. The states which influence it §240, p. 266 

1^. Temperament. 
1*. What it designates. 
1^. To what it determines a man and to what it in- 
clines him. 
2'. How they have been denominated. 
1^. What distinguish them. 
2^ Mood and humor. 
1^ How it differs from temperament. 
2^ Its predisposing cause. 
3^. How moods exist. 
4^. Their expression. 
3®. Disposition. 
1*. Its relation to mind. 
2^ What mark different dispositions. 

2"^. Characteristics of the Emotions §241, p. 268 

1®. The specific difference between emotion and senti- 
ment. 
1^ Negative mark. 
2*. Positive mark. 
1^. Effect of different emotions. 
2®. Diffusive effects of emotion compared with other 
classes of feelings. 
1'. Various effects. 

3^. Groups of emotion §242, p. 269 

1®. How the members differ. 
l^ The group of which wonder is typical. 
1^. The order of degree. 
2^. The pleasure and pain attending these. 
3^. Relation of wonder to knowledge. 

2'. The group of which fear is typical §243, p. 270 

1^. The order of degree. 

2^. The prospective nature of these. 

1^. On what it is specially dependent. 
3^. In what its cause is generally involved. 

1^. Of what fear is the offspring. 
4^. The pain attending it. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 87 

5^. Its organic influence. 
1^. Expressions. 
3'. Joy, its series and their contrasts. . . .§244, p. 272 
1^. Which are pleasurable and which painful. 
2^. When joy and when sorrow arise. 

1*^. To what they bear a special relation. 
3^. Inhibiting effect of rapture. 
4^. Organic effect. 
1^. Expressions. 

4'. The emotion accompanying love §245, p. 273 

1^. What love is strictly taken. 
2^. By what love is attended. 

1^. The strength of these. 
3^. The nature of the emotion. 
4^. Its opposite. 

l'^. What Jealousy is. 
5^. To what its chief instinctive expressions are re- 
ducible. 

5^. Sympathy §246, p. 274 

!«. What this is. 

2^. What it sets aside. 

3^. To whom it awakens most strongly. 

4^. Its etymological opposite and its pure negative. 

5^. Sympathy both gives and takes. 

6^. The influence of numbers. 

1\ What panic is. 
7^. Its expression. 
1°. Sentiment. 

1^ Its mark §247, p. 277 

1®. How distinguished from emotion. 
2'^. Subdivision of sentiment. 

l^ Sensuous sentiments §248, p. 277 

1'. Definition. 
2^. Examples of these. 
1^. Beauty. 
1^. From what it must be distinguished. 
1^ Its objective cause or that in an object which 
makes it beautiful. 
1^. By what such an object is approved. 
2^. With what we have nothing to do. 
1^. That quality in objects which renders them 

beautiful. 
2^. The judgment of taste. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

3^. The laws which, should regulate its decision. 
2^. Its characteristics. 
1\ Always and highly pleasing. 
1^ Some limitations. 
1^. It is always a sensuous sentiment. 

1^ Where its objects are. 
2\ Of what the beautiful is a union. 

1^ What is meant by this. 
3^. Though sensuous, beauty is not a sensation 
nor an emotion nor a desire. 
1^ Whence the especial charm of poetry and 
fiction. 
4^. On what it is directly conditioned. 
1^ What senses are aesthetic senses. 

2s. Sublimity §249, p. 280 

1^. Contrasted with beauty. 
2^. Its essence. 
3^. Picturesque and ludicrous. 
1^. The relation of their objects to the plane of in- 
difference as compared with the objects of 
beauty and sublimity. 
2^. What the sentiment of the ludicrous is. 

4s. Utility §250, p. 281 

1*^. How distinguished from beauty. 
2^. What is sometimes said. 

2«. Pure sentiments §251, p. 282 

1'. Those that are intellectual and nothing more. 
How they are intellectual. 
1^. Those not requiring a personal object. 
1^. Truth and what it is. 
1'. From what distinguished. 
2\ To what it often rises. 
3*. By what it is often attended. 
2^. The charm of property. 
3^. Pleasure of pursuit. 

4^. Upon what the pleasurable sentiment attending 
freedom arises. 
1\ What we have in these opposites. 
2K From what it arises. 

1^ Release from restraint. 
3K What it is — pleasure of deliverance. 
1^ What maintains it when the contrast disap- 
pears. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 89 

I''. Liberty suggesting positive pleasure of pur- 
suit. 
2^. Those requiring a personal object. . .§252, p. 284 
l^ The personal object being another. .§253, p. 286 
1^ Honor. 
1^. To whom given. 

2^ How differing from admiration and esteem. 
3^. Its opposites. 
2K Trust or confidence. 
1^. To whom given. 
2^ Its opposite. 
3^. How differing from faith. 
3*. Pity. 
1^ To whom given. 
2^ By what often attended. 
3^ What desire it excites. 
4:K What it is called. 
2\ The personal object being ourselves. §253, p. 286 
1^ The sentiments arising on the contemplation 
of our own excellence or absolute worth. 
1^ These sentiments are known as what. 
1^. Their opposites. 

2^^. What intensifies the pleasure or pain of these 
feelings. 
2K Personal honor. 
3*. Humiliation. 

1^. When turned into mortification. 
4}. Humility. 
1^. Its opposite. 
2^. What it admits. 
3^. What it implies. 
2'. Those which are Intellectual and something more, 
that is Pure Moral Sentiments. . . .§254, p. 287 
1^. In what sense they are pure. 

2^. How they differ from the class exclusively in- 
tellectual. 
3^. What is their essential basis. 
4^. Their distribution. 
1^. What may be taken as generic or as implying 
the moral sentiments generally. 
1^ Moral obligation, the sentiment of dut}^, at- 
tending the intuition of moral law in its 
specific applications. 



90 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

2^. Those that may be taken as specific. 
1'. Moral sentiments in view of character. 
1^ Respect. 
I''. What inspires this. 

2^. When the ethical element becomes predomi- 
nant. 
2'. Moral sentiments in view of specific conduct. 
1^ When another is the agent. 

1^. Approbation or disapprobation. 
2K When self is the agent. 
1*^. Self-approbation or self-condemnation, self- 
reproach, shame, remorse. 
1'. When shamelessness results. 
1™. With what consistent. 
2™. With what inconsistent. 
3^. Gratitude. 
1^. By what awakened. 
2^ What it is. - 
3^. What it inspires. 
4^^. In what it is essential. 
5^. Its most obligator}^ form. 
4:K Justice. 
I''. To what closely allied. 
3^. Desire. (For 2^ see p. 82 of this anatysis.) 
I''. Definition. A conscious activity marked by a want, 
implying an impulse or tendency relative to an object 
seemingly fitted to the want. 
2^. Its relations to the other generic powers. . .§256, p. 293 
1*^. To Cognition. 
1"^. The object of Desire. The thing desired is properly 
an object of Cognition. Desire is, therefore, condi- 
tioned on Cognition §-55, p. 289 

2^. Its means. The means to attain the desired end must 
be cognized. Hence Desire is conditioned sec- 
ondarily and specificall}^ on the ieleogical judg- 
ment. 
1^ Proof that Desire is also conditioned on a practical 
judgment. 
3*^. Proof that Desire is also conditioned on imagination. 
1®. Proof that Desire is conditioned on the practical 
imagination. 
2^ To Feeling. 
1*^. What Desire has in common with Feeling. 



Analysts of Elements of Psychology. 91 

2^. By what Desire is distinguished from Feeling. 
1®. By the specific difference of Desire — want and im- 
pulse. 
2®. By the characteristic mark of Feeling — pleasure or 
pain. 
1*. What Desires are usually considered to be. 
1^. What results from this. 
1^. Distinct psychical powers are confused. 
2^. The doctrine of conation, especially of motive, is 
obscured by making pleasure and pain all- 
dominating. 
3^. It leads to Utilitarianism in morals and Pessi- 
mism in philosophy. 
2*. How the confusion may be cleared. 
1^. Pleasure and pain belong to Feeling only. 
2K Want and impulse belong to Desire only. 
1^. How feelings of pleasure and pain are related to 
Desire. 
1^ Antecedent to Desire — "exciting." 
2^ Coexisting with Desire — "attending." 
3^ Consequent upon Desire — "arising on." 
3^. How the distinction becomes clearer. 
3®. Another mark of distinction is time. Feelings pleas- 
ant and painful belong exclusively to the present. 
Desire and aversion have reference to the future. 
4®. Feelings are related to Desires as cause and effect. 
1*. Examples. 
3°. To Volition. 

1"^. Volition conditioned on Desire §257, p. 293 

1®. What Desires are called in this relation. 
2^. Desire conditioned on the existence of Volition. 
3^. Strong Will implies strong Desire and weak Will 
weak Desire. 
4^ What Desires we have thus far spoken of. .§258, p. 294 
1^. Rational Desires. There are also blind impulses, 
psychic Desires. 

3^ Kinds of Desire §259, p. 295 

1^. Craving Desires. 
1^. Appetites, having a physical basis. 
2*^. Appetences, having a psychic basis. 
2°. Giving Desires. 

1^. Affections. 
1°. Craving Desires (see just above). 



92 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

1^. To what they incline. 

1®. To impersonal objects. 
2^. The opposite aversion of the Craving Desires. 
1®. Of appetite. 
1'. Distaste or disgust. 
2®. Of appetence. 
1^ A more negative disregard or disinclination. 
3*. Distribution of Craving Desires. 

1^ Appetites §260, p. 296 

1*. Definition. 

2'. To what they correspond in general. 

1^. The sensations. 
3'. By what preceded and attended. 
1^. Sensations as causes. 
1^. The sensations inducing appetite belong chiefly 
to the sensus vagus. 
4*. Distribution of the appetites. 
1^. Natural appetites. 
1^. To maintain life. 
1^ Hunger and thirst. 
2\ Desire for air. 
3^ Drowsiness. 
2^. To propagate life. 
1^ Lust. 
2^. Artificial appetites. 
l'^. How acquired. 

1\ By habit. 
2^. How transmitted. 
1*. By heredity. 
3^. Longings hard to distinguish from appetites. 
5'. How further to distinguish appetites from other 
Desires. 
1^. Periodicity of appetites, hence satisfaction. 

2®. Appentences, Psychic Desires §261, p. 298 

1'. What they are. 
1^. Cravings produced by a recognized need of men- 
tal life. 
2'. To what they correspond in a loose and general way. 

1^. To the emotions as causes. 
3'. Persistency as compared with the appetites. 
1^. More persistent and are gratified rather than 
satisfied. 
4'. To what they are directed. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 93 

1^. To things and to persons viewed not as persons, 
but as things. 
5^ What forms they take. 

1^. Both of Desires proper and of aversions. 
6\ Appetites and appetences, being cravings, are pri- 
marily strictly selfish in their aims and ends. 
7'. Instances of the appetences. 
1^. Non-social Desires. 
1^. To continue in life. 
2*^. Universal Desire for pleasure and aversion to 

pain. 
3^. Curiosity. 
4^. Acquisitiveness. 
2^. Social Desires. 
I*'. Ambition. 
2^. Sociality. 
1\ To what it is akin. 
2\ What arises out of it. 
3*^. Approbativeness. 

3°. Giving Desires or Affections §262, p. 300 

1^. To what they incline. 

1«. To Persons. (See §259, p. 295.) 
2^. What they are. Affections. 
1®. Definition of affections. 

2®. To what they correspond in a loose and general way. 
1^ To the sentiments as their causes. Hence ac- 
counted specially human. 
3®. By what they are attended. 
4®. Their tendency. 
1^ Practically the reverse of the appetites and psychic 
cravings, for they do not take, but give. 
5®. Toward whom exercised. 
1'. Toward persons or sentient beings only. 
1^. What they presuppose. 
1^. Intelligence in the subject and also a conceivable 
harmony or discord of affection in the object. 
6®. How contrast with psychic cravings and appetites. 

1^ In being wholly unselfish. 
7®. Subdivision of the affections. 
1'. Benevolent affections. Note how they are modified. 
1^. Kinship. 

1^. Its varieties. 
2^. Friendship-. 



94 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

3^. Love of Benefactor. 

1^. From what it arises. 
4^. Eacial or tribal. 
5^. Patriotism. 
6^. Philanthropy. 
7^. Love of God. 
2^ Malevolent affections. 
1^. Those having a defensive or punitive element. 
1^. Hatred. 
2^. Anger. 
3^. Revenge. 
4^^. Jealousy. 
2^. That which is simply injurious. 
1\ Envy. 
2^. Cruelty. 
3^. Misanthropy. 

4^ Its Regulation §264, p. 305 

1^. Why needed. 
1^. Because Desires often conflict. 
1^. Between what desires this conflict occurs. 
1^. Between members of the same class. 
2^. More notably between members of different classes. 
3^ In general between the Craving Desires which 
would take and the affections which would give. 
1^. In instinctive exercise the appetites are strongest, 
the affections weakest, though exceptions occur. 
2^. In rational exercise there is a recognized grada- 
tion in dignity or worth and exellence, affec- 
tion being highest in the scale and appetite the 
lowest. 
1^. To what this superiority of affection is due. 
1'. To affection having the larger share of the ra- 
tional element. 
2\ To the call for self-denial. 
3'. To the intimate relation between the exercise of 

affection and the observance of moral law. 
4'. Xeither class by nature has supremacy. 
1^ Where the controlling principle is found. 
2^ What controls. 
1^. The Regulative Desires, fitted by their nature to 
subordinate and regulate all others. 
3°. Distribution of the Regulative Desires. . .§265, p. 305 
1*^. Duty, or the desire to do right.- 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 95 

1®. What it may fairly be called. 

1^ The moral impulse. 
2®. From what it should be distinguished. 

1'. Conscience. 
3®. To what the moral impulse urges us. 
1^. To pay our dues in the widest sense. 
4®. What is its direction and tendency. 

1^ Strictly altruistic. 
5®. With what it is specially related. 
1^ With the affections. 
2^. Interest, or the desire for happiness. 
1^. What it is often, though improperly, called. 

1^ Self-love and thus confused with the affections. 
2^. To what it urges. 
1'. To seek and to appropriate the means to our own 
happiness as an end. 
3®. What is its direction and tendency. 

1^ Strictly egoistic and selfish. 
i®. With what it is intimately related. 
1'. The Craving Desires, the appetites and appetences. 
4^. Analysis discussed. 
1^. What the foregoing analysis seems to indicate. 
1®. That the two Eegulative Desires are in essential 

opposition. 
2^ That duty conflicts with interest and impels us away 
from happiness. 
2^. The mistake of this indication. 

l^ They do not strictly conflict. 
3**. How the relation is more truly conceived. 
1®. As to interest. 
2«. As to duty. 
4*. Highest happiness as defined by Aristotle. 
5**. What then appears. 
P. That the moral impulse has by nature and right the 
ofiice of control over interest, and it alone is su- 
preme over all Desires. 
5^. The relations of the Regulative to the subordinate 

Desires more particularly shown §^66, p. 307 

1^. With the benevolent affections. 
2"*. With the craving desires. 
6°. The relation of the moral impulse to Cognition. 

§267, p. 308 
1^. Conditioned on it in a special manner. 



96 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

2^. To what its authority is directed. 
7*'. Conscience. 
1^. Its popular usage. 
2^. Its correct definition. 
4^ Will. (For 3^ see p. 90 of this analysis.) 

IK Its definition. Note its functions also §268, p. 309 

2^ Its relations. 
V. To Cognition. 
1^. Contrasts between Cognition and Will. 
1®. Their objects. 
2®. Their aims. 

2\ Double relation to Cognition §269, p. 310 

1®. Inferior as dependent on Cognition for guidance. 
2®. Superior as controlling it. 

2^ To Feeling §270, p. 311 

1^. How conditioned on them, only remotely through 

the Desires. 
2^. How it controls them, only indirectly through atten- 
tion. 
3^ To desire. 
1^. How conditioned on them — directly. 
2^. How it controls Desire — indirectly and by means of 
attention. 

4^ Controlling power of Will §271, p. 311 

1*^. Subjective control. 
2*^. Objective control. 
3^ Its Elements. 

v. Ultimate Facts §272, p. 313 

1^. The idea of something to be done, of an act in order 
to an end. This is an exercise of cognitive intel- 
ligence. 
2^. An impulse urging the action. An exercise of Desire. 
3^ A preference. An exercise of choice. 
4^. Intention. 

5^. A nisus or striving to effectuate the choice. This is 
voluntary effort. 
2^ The true elements. 

1^. Choice §273, p. 311 

1®. Its two special conditions precedent. 
1*. Alternativity of possible action, implying independ- 
ence of objective control or causation. 
2^ A corresponding plurality of impulses. 
2®. What presides over these conditions precedent. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 97 

1'. The function of deliberative intelligence. 
3®. The distinction between the judgment rendered and 

the choice made. 
4®. The distinction between the choice in abeyance and 

the choice made §^74, p. 315 

2*^, Intention or completed choice. 

3^. Effort §275, p. 316 

1®. How characterized. 

1'. As a nisus or striving. 
2«. What it is. 
1^ The final and complete expression of the free per- 
sonality. 
3®. Upon what it is consequent and to what subsequent. 

1^ Choice. 
4®. What it effectuates. 

1^ Intention. 
5^. Its relation to consciousness. 

1^ It is an ultimate fact of consciousness. 
6®. What the voluntary effort strives to produce. 
1^ Some definite change of mental state only, or 
2'. To superinduce muscular movement. 
7®. In what the subjective voluntary action is complete. 
1^ In the mental effort, even though the proposed con- 
sequences be imperfect or entirely null. 
4^. Its Freedom. 

1^ The different doctrines §276, p. 318 

1*. Necessity. 
1®. Forms and modifications. 
1^ Fatalism, strict necessity. 
2^. Determinism. 
1^. The special definition of liberty given by these. 
1^. Will is free when acting according to its nature, 
and it is its nature to be determined by desires. 
2-^. Liberty. 
1®. Forms and modifications. 
1^ In general allows that desires influence the will, 

but denies the determination. 
2'. Exhibits the will as controlling the other faculties, 

including desires. 
3^ Desires occasions, not causes of, volition. 
4^ With what the outcome accords. 
5^ What the doctrine represents as to will and desire. 

2«. Am I free? §277, p. 318 

7 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

1^ Why should there be concern on this question ? 
1^. An old, much discussed, and thus far unsolved 
question. 
1^. Importance of the question is the apology for the 
attempt to throw light upon it. 
2^. If I am not free, what am I ? 
1^. Not a person, only a thing. 
2^. !N'either the beginning nor the end of anything, 

merely a channel. 
3^. Not a creator, but a creature of circumstances. 
3^. Kant names doctrine of freedom as one of the 
three great ends of philosophy. 
1^. Does it not rather lie at the beginning of all 
philosophy ? 
1'. Unless I am free, there is no philosophy. 
1^ Why power to discriminate true and false is 

not suflBcient. 
2^ Why in this case there can be no search after 
truth. 
4^. Freedom a postulate of Ethics. 
1^. Unless I am free, what follows ? 
2^ A logical objection to this procedure and the retort. 

§278, p. 320 
1^. Since search for truth implies freedom, the at- 
tempt to answer begs the question. 
1^. The doubt is only speculative, not actual. 
2^. The attempt to disprove freedom tacitly assumes 
it. 

3^ What is in favor of freedom §279, p. 321 

1^. Logical presumption because of universal convic- 
tion of mankind. 
1^. What the necessitarian says of this common con- 
viction. 

2^. Where the burden of proof rests §280, p. 321 

4*. The argument for necessity. 
1^. The argument examined. 

2^. Various replies to the argument. . . .§281, p. 322 
1^. Some assert that we are conscious of liberty. 
1\ If true, what this would be. 
2*. Why this claim is inadmissible. 
1^ The notion freedom is a pure negative. 
1^. What follows. 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 99 

1'. Cannot be conscious of the absence of a 

thing. 
2K Unconsciousness of constraint proves noth- 
ing. 
3^ It is conceivable that constraint may uncon- 
sciously exist. 
4:K The belief that we can elect either of two 
alternatives makes the choice future, but 
consciousness is of the present. 
5^ Cannot be conscious that we might have 
chosen differently, for that would be con- 
sciousness of the past. 
6^ "The power of a contrary choice" is not a 
fact of consciousness. 
2^. Other libertarians assert that the law of causa- 
tion, while universal in form, is not universal 

in fact §282, p. 324 

1\ The nature of volitional cause according to these 
advocates. 
1^. The futility of this position. 
3^. Those who assert that the law of causation is 
modified in its application to mental phe- 
nomena §283, p. 325 

1'. No statement of the modified law has been 

made. 
2\ It is the law of uniformity that is thought to 
be inapplicable to mind. 

1^ The reply to this assertion §284, p. 327 

4^. Two extreme views. 
1^ That the law of causation is altogether inappli- 
cable to mental phenomena. 
1^'. Their explanation of spontaneity. 
2^ Evidence of causation in mental phenomena. 
3^ Evidence that mental phenomena are strictly 
the only phenomena; that only subjective 
changes are known immediately; that the 
law of causation applies originally and pri- 
marily to mind; and the transference, if 
there be any transference, takes place from 
the mental to the physical. 

2^ The doctrine of free agency §285, p. 329 

1^. How these advocates seek to save liberty. 
1^. Their definition of freedom. 



100 Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 

2^. The function of desires according to these ad- 
vocates. 
3^. Their assertion that liberty and necessity may 

coexist. 
2^. The argument for free agency examined. 
1^. This definition of liberty is not the one under 
which we have been working. 
1^ Free agency is not subjective but objective 
liberty. 
2^. The liberty essential to personality is alto- 
gether different. 
3^ Free agency is necessity in disguise. 
3^. Critical analysis of the necessitarian argument. 

§286, p. 332 
1^. The premise, "a volition is a change," is not an 
axiom. 
1'. The two elements of ^T)lition, choice and eSort. 
1^ Effort is a change. 
1^. The cause of effort. 
1^ The prevailing desire or motive. 
I"". The double method of agreement and dif- 
ference used to establish this fact. 
1^. The cases which agree only in the fact 
that antecedent desire and subsequent 
effort are present. 
1°. Instinctive action in appetites. 
2°. Instinctive impulses in the higher de- 
sires. 
2°. Agreement in absence. 
1°. Where no desire is, no effort is. 

2\ Choice §287, p. 333 

l'^. The question whether choice exists, for its 

essence is freedom. 
2^. The argument should not grant what it pro- 
poses to disprove. 
3^, Choice is not a change. 
1^ Distinguish the act of choosing from the 

fact of choice §288, p. 334 

1™. Choosing as an act is a change and hence 

is necessitated. 
2™. Choice as a fact is not a movement for- 
ward. 
P. Is choice a change? §289, p. 335 



Analysis of Elements of Psychology. 101 

1°. Choice as preference is not a change. 
2°. Choice for inaction. 

4^ Choice is not caused §290, p. 336 

1'. Argument for this fact. 
2^ What follows from the discovery of this 
false premise. 
5'. Consideration of two important points. §291, p. 337 
1^. Freedom a postulate of ethics. 

1*^. What this involves. 
2^. The conditioning antecedents of choice. 

§292, p. 338 
1^. Some desire for each available alternative must 

exist. 
2^. Election occurs only in vi^w of reasons. 



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